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ABSTRACT
Electricity is the prototypical just-in-time product due to the limited means to economically
store it on a large-scale basis. As such, electricity must be consumed as soon as it is produced.
In areas of the U.S. grid with competitive electricity markets, independent system operators
(ISOs) run day-ahead electricity markets (DAM s) to determine which resources will meet the
demand and ensure adequate capacity is committed so that the supply-demand balance can
be met around the clock. System operators have met the demand by controlling the output
of the supply-side resources, namely generators, since there is a limited amount of grid-
scale energy storage (ES ) in operation today and little participation from the demand-side
in meeting the supply-demand balance. The reliance on supply-side resources to maintain
the supply-demand balance results, at times, in high prices, marked price volatility, and
even price spikes. These price issues, along with advances in storage and communication
technology, have reinvigorated the drive of policymakers, system planners and operators,
private investors and other electricity grid stakeholders to expand the utilization of ES and
demand response (DR) resources to reliably and effectively meet the supply-demand balance.
ES and DR resources provide the ISO with additional degrees of freedom in meeting the
supply-demand balance by enabling electricity to be stored and shifted from peak load hours
to lower load hours, which may decrease the operational costs and improve system reliability.
We know of no work which has studied the economic impacts of integrated DR and ES
resources in depth. Consequently, there is a limited understanding among electricity grid
stakeholders of the economic impacts of deepening ES and DR resource penetrations on
the DAM s. To develop operational and planning strategies which are effective and policies
which incentivize appropriate penetrations of ES and DR resources, grid stakeholders need
to understand these impacts.
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In this work, we provide a comparative economic assessment of the impacts of DR and
ES resources participating in the DAM s. In order to perform the assessment, we construct
a flexible simulation approach which represents the salient aspects of the DAM s and the
current regulatory environment. The engine of our approach is the extended transmission-
constrained market clearing problem (EMCP). In the EMCP framework, we explicitly ac-
count for ES and DR resources and the transmission-constrained network. Furthermore, we
represent DR resources (DRRs) as a special case of ES resources (ESRs), which allows for the
comparison of ES and DR resources on equal footing. Our approach also allows the assess-
ment of the impacts of DRR recovery energy—an important, and often ignored, component
of economic impacts of DRRs on the DAM s. This flexible approach provides stakeholders
the means to develop a deeper understanding of the economic impacts of integrated ES and
DR resources participating in the DAM s.
We apply the simulation approach to perform the comparative economic assessment of
the impacts of deepening capacity penetrations of ES and DR resources with their explicit
participation in DAM s using data from the ISO-New England (ISO-NE ) and Midwest ISO
(MISO). Through our extensive studies, we have determined the average buyer locational
marginal price (ABLMP) to be an effective metric for measuring the economic impacts of
DR and ES resources on the DAM s. In our studies, we investigate the reductions in average
buyer locational marginal price (ABLMP) which result from the participation of ES and
DR resources with capacities penetrations in the 0% to 30% of system peak load range.
We find the deployment of ESRs has a greater impact on reducing the ABLMP than DRRs
at each penetration investigated, reducing the ABLMPs by as much as 9.2% compared to
the base case system with no deployed DR or ES resources. DRRs, on the other hand,
resulted in ABLMP reductions of at most 2.7% compared to the base case due to the
additional regulatory constraints in place for DRRs. Furthermore, we find that DRRs cause
increases in the ABLMP at relatively low penetrations when DRR energy recovery is taken
into account—contrary to the results of other studies which have investigated the economic
impacts of DRRs in the market environment. Additionally, we find that systems which
experience a greater difference between the average peak and off-peak locational marginal
prices (LMPs) and/or a higher ratio of average peak to off-peak loads accommodate deeper
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penetrations of ES and DR resources before the ABLMP reductions are saturated with
respect to ES and/or DR resources—the sensitivity of the ABLMP reductions compared
to the base case to an additional MW of ES and DR resource capacity becomes zero or
negative. We find that the economic impacts of DRRs on the ABLMPs saturate at 2%–6%
penetration while those of ESRs saturate at 9%–20% penetration of the system peak load.
The results of such studies provide useful information for planning, the development of op-
erational procedures, the formulation of effective policy and other electricity grid stakeholder
decision making processes. Moreover, the flexible market simulation approach developed in
this work provides electricity grid stakeholders a means to perform a number of “what if”
studies to analyze the economic impacts of the various aspects of ES and DR resources on
the DAM s.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we set the stage for the work presented in this thesis. In this work, we
provide a comparative economic assessment of the impacts of demand response (DR) and
energy storage (ES ) resources participating in the day-ahead electricity markets (DAM s). In
order to perform the assessment, we construct a flexible market simulation approach which
explicitly represents both ES and DR resources and the transmission-constrained network
and takes into account the current regulatory environment.
Our flexible simulation approach represents the salient aspects of the DAM s and the
current regulatory environment. The engine of our approach is the extended transmission-
constrained market clearing problem (EMCP). In the EMCP framework, we explicitly ac-
count for ES and DR resources and the transmission-constrained network. Furthermore, we
represent DR resources (DRRs) as a special case of ES resources (ESRs), which allows for the
comparison of ES and DR resources on equal footing. Our approach also allows the assess-
ment of the impacts of DRR recovery energy—an important, and often ignored, component
of economic impacts of DRRs on the DAM s. This flexible approach provides stakeholders
a means to develop a deeper understanding of the economic impacts of integrated ES and
DR resources participating in the DAM s.
We apply the simulation approach to perform the comparative economic assessment of
the impacts of deepening capacity penetrations of ES and DR resources with their explicit
participation in DAM s using data from the ISO-New England (ISO-NE ) and the MISO.
Through our extensive studies, we have determined the average buyer locational marginal
price (ABLMP) to be an effective metric for measuring the economic impacts of DR and
ES resources on the DAM s. In our studies, we investigate the reductions in average buyer
locational marginal price (ABLMP) which result from the participation of ES and DR
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resources with capacities penetrations in the 0% to 30% of system peak load range.
We find the deployment of ESRs has a greater impact on reducing the ABLMP than DRRs
at each penetration investigated, reducing the ABLMPs by as much as 9.2% compared to
the base case system with no deployed DR or ES resources. DRRs, on the other hand,
resulted in ABLMP reductions of at most 2.7% compared to the base case due to the
additional regulatory constraints in place for DRRs. Furthermore, we find that DRRs cause
increases in the ABLMP at relatively low penetrations when DRR energy recovery is taken
into account—contrary to the results of other studies which have investigated the economic
impacts of DRRs in the market environment. Additionally, we find that systems which
experience a greater difference between the average peak and off-peak locational marginal
prices (LMPs) and/or a higher ratio of average peak to off-peak loads accommodate deeper
penetrations of ES and DR resources before the ABLMP reductions are saturated with
respect to ES and/or DR resources—the sensitivity of the ABLMP reductions compared
to the base case to an additional MW of ES and DR resource capacity becomes zero or
negative. We find that the economic impacts of DRRs on the ABLMPs saturate at 2%–6%
penetration while those of ESRs saturate at 9%–20% penetration.
The results of such studies provide useful information for planning, the development of op-
erational procedures, the formulation of effective policy and other electricity grid stakeholder
decision making processes. Furthermore, the flexible market simulation approach developed
in this work provides electricity grid stakeholders a means to perform a number of “what if”
studies to analyze the economic impacts of the various aspects of ES and DR resources on
the DAM s.
We begin this chapter by providing some necessary background on DR and ES resources
and motivating our interest in the subject. We continue with a description of the state-of-the-
art of research in DR and ES resource economic impacts. We then describe the nature and
scope of our contributions. We end this chapter with an outline of the remaining chapters
in the thesis.
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1.1 Background and Motivation
Electricity is the prototypical just-in-time product due to the limited means to economically
store it on a large-scale basis. As such, electricity must be consumed as soon as it is produced.
In areas of the U.S. grid with competitive electricity markets, independent system operators
(ISOs) run DAM s to determine which resources will meet the cleared demand and ensure
adequate capacity is committed so that the supply-demand balance can be met around the
clock. There is a limited amount of grid-scale ES in operation today. Furthermore, there is
little participation from the demand-side in meeting the supply-demand balance. As a result,
system operators have met the demand by controlling the output of the supply-side resources,
namely generators. The reliance on supply-side resources to maintain the supply-demand
balance results, at times, in high prices, marked price volatility, and even price spikes.
These price issues, along with advances in storage and communication technology, have
reinvigorated the drive of policymakers, system planners and operators, private investors
and other electricity grid stakeholders to expand the utilization of ES and demand response
(DR) resources to reliably and effectively meet the supply-demand balance.
DRRs and ESRs provide the system operator with additional degrees of freedom to meet
the supply-demand balance, which may decrease the operational cost, relieve peak-hour
congestion and increase system reliability. DRRs are consumers of electricity who provide
reductions in the consumption of electric energy from their expected consumption in response
to an increase in the price of electric energy or to incentive payments designed to induce
lower consumption of electric energy at specified times. ESRs are devices that have the
capability to store electric energy, acting as a load, and discharge the energy in the future,
acting as a generator. ESRs may have the capability to store energy for discharge over
periods of hour or days, as in the case of compressed air or pumped hydro storage, or for a
matter of seconds or minutes, as in the case of flywheels or super capacitors. Our focus is
on former and not the latter.
In the restructured electricity system, DR and ES resources participate in the ISO-run
DAM s. With participation in the electricity market from DR and ES resources, the ISO
has the ability to shape the load through demand reductions or the transfer of demand from
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peak to off-peak hours or days. The system benefits of the appropriate use of ES and DR
resources for load shaping may lead to:
• attenuated DAM price volatility;
• increased reliability via increased reserve margins and resource flexibility;
• delayed need for investment in new transmission and generation due to a reduced
system peak load met by the supply-side; and
• mitigated impacts of the intermittency and variability from renewable resource gener-
ation [1], [2].
In this work we focus on the economic impacts of ES and DR resources on the DAM s.
In the ISO-run DAM s, supply-side resources (sellers) offer the quantities of energy they
are willing to provide and the prices at which they are willing to provide them and demand-
side resources (buyers) bid to buy electricity in amounts to meet their loads and at prices
commensurate with their willingness to pay.1 The ISO constructs an offer curve by sort-
ing the supply-side resource offers in a non-descending order of price. Similarly, the ISO
constructs a demand curve by sorting the demand bids in a non-ascending order of price.
In a transmission-unconstrained system, the point of intersection of the offer and demand
curves is the market clearing point with a single system-wide marginal price. When the
system is transmission-constrained, the markets are cleared on a nodal basis resulting in
node-dependent locational marginal prices (LMPs).
Figure 1.1 depicts the average hourly July DAM offer curve from the ISO of New England
(ISO-NE ) system with three load levels. When the offer curve has small slope, such as
point A in the Fig. 1.1, small changes in the supply result in small changes in the price.
Consequently, the price increases very little with increases in the load. When the slope of
the offer curve is bigger, such as point B in Fig. 1.1, small increases in the supply have
a greater impact on the price. Consequently, increases in the load cause greater increases
1Most of the demand bid into the DAM s is bid by energy service providers (ESPs) which have an
obligation to serve the loads of their customers. As such, the ESP ’s willingness to pay in the DAM s is very
high and we consider their demand fixed.
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Figure 1.1: An ISO-NE offer curve for July 2010 with three load levels
in the price. When the slope of the offer curve is even greater, such as point C in Fig.
1.1, small changes in the supply can have a significant impact on the price and therefore,
small increases (decreases) in the load cause significant increases (decreases) in the prices.
The evident “hockey stick” shape of the curve is characteristic of the offer curves in many
electricity markets. Figure 1.2 depicts the hourly loads and hourly LMPs for an of ISO-NE
load zone for the week of July 12–18, 2010. It is clear from Fig. 1.2 that the load in the
ISO-NE system is periodic; it is high in the peak, afternoon, hours and low in the off-peak,
night, hours. It is also evident that the prices are positively correlated with the loads; as
the loads in Fig. 1.2 increase we see subsequent increases in the LMPs in Fig. 1.2. The load
increases shift the market clearing point in the direction from point B to point C on the offer
curve in Fig. 1.1. In the absence of demand-side approaches to meeting the supply-demand
balance, the system operator must rely solely on supply-side resources. We also see that
the percent increase in price is greater than that of the increase in loads due to the lower
elasticity of supply resulting in much higher prices in high load hours of Fig. 1.2. In this
ISO-NE load zone, the peak load hour prices are as much as four times the off-peak load
hour prices.
5
0 24 48 72 96 120 144 168
0
750
1,500
2,250
3,000
hour
lo
a
d
(M
W
h
/
h
)
0
15
30
45
60
75
90
L
M
P
($
/
M
W
h
)
load
LMP
Figure 1.2: The hourly loads and the hourly LMPs for a load zone in ISO-NE for the week
of July 12–18, 2010
ESRs (DRRs) provide discharges (curtailments) which impact the market outcomes by
displacing (reducing the need for) higher-priced generators in peak load hours, shifting the
market clearing point down the offer curve and resulting in reduced peak prices. The energy
discharged (curtailed) is then charged (recovered) in off-peak load hours, shifting the market
clearing point up the offer curve in those hours and resulting in increased off-peak prices.
However, since the slope of the offer curve in the off-peak hours is, in general, less than that
of the offer curve in the peak hours, the off-peak price increases are less than the peak price
decreases.
The DOE, seeking to accelerate the pace of utility-scale ESR adoption, has funded over
a dozen ESR pilot projects with $158 million in funding from the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) which has been matched by $585 million from industry [3]. One
example is Southern California Edison who, in a partnership with A123 Systems and with
DOE funding, will test an 8 MW 32 MWh phosphorus lithium-ion battery storage facility
located near a number of wind farms in the Tehachapi Mountains beginning in late 2012.
The tests will include the use of ESRs to shift demand from peak to off-peak as well as
explore other services ESRs may provide to the grid [4]. In another example, the Northern
6
California utility Pacific Gas and Electric was awarded $50 million in ARRA funding to
explore the installation of a 300 MW, 10 hr, compressed air energy storage facility which
is intended to support the integration of wind resources in the Tehachapi Mountains. The
technologies tested in these pilot projects represent the next generation of utility-scale ESRs
and will demonstrate the utilization of ESRs to shift demand across the hours of the day.
Pike research estimated new ESR deployment to be 121 MW in 2011 and forecasts new
deployment to grow to 2353 MW by 2021 [3]. The pace of ESR installation is increasing
and it will have a greater role in maintaining a secure and cost-effective grid into the future.
The recent push for pilot projects has been accompanied by a number of policy initiatives
designed to promote greater use of ES and DR resources, such as the Energy Policy Act of
2005 (EPAct) and FERC Order Nos. 719 and 745.
The major regulatory push for the greater integration of DR and ES resources into elec-
tricity markets came with the EPAct. EPAct required the DOE to identify and quantify
the benefits of ES and DR resources and make recommendations for achieving them and
authorized $2 billion in loan guarantees for innovative energy technologies [1]. A resulting
DRR-related report describes several studies which quantify the benefits of DRRs and makes
a number of general recommendations for achieving deeper penetrations of demand-side
participation including integrating demand response into resource planning, and improving
incentive-based demand response programs [5]. EPAct and this initial report provided the
basis and impetus for further regulatory action on DRRs.
The ISO-run markets are overseen by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC ).
FERC regulates the electricity and ancillary service markets to ensure they remain compet-
itive and that all players are treated in a just and not unduly discriminatory manner. DRRs
have been the subject of two FERC orders since EPAct [6], [7]. FERC Order No. 745
on the wholesale energy market compensation of DRRs encourages direct competition be-
tween DRRs and supply-side resources in wholesale energy markets. The order lays out the
following two requirements:
1. ISOs must develop a “Net Benefits Test” to determine on a monthly basis, using
historical supplier offer data, the generation mix and fuel prices, a “threshold price”;
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and
2. If the LMP exceeds the threshold price at a given node in a market interval, i.e.,
an hour, all cleared DRRs at the node in that interval must be compensated at the
LMP. The costs of these DRR curtailments are to be allocated to those loads which
experience a reduced LMP as a result of the DRR curtailments.
The Net Benefits Test is designed to determine the minimum price where the benefits of a
DRR curtailment, in the form of reduced prices faced by the remaining loads, exceed the
costs, in the form of distributing the incentive payments made by the remaining loads to
compensate DRRs for their curtailments. To determine the price at which DRRs become a
cost-effective alternative to supply-side resources, the Net Benefits Test uses a system-wide
threshold price calculated from the ISO supply curve. The implementation of the specific
Net Benefits Test is left of up the individual ISO, though all have developed some variation
of regression of historical supply offers to determine the point on a monthly aggregate supply
curve at which the elasticity of supply is equal to one—the point at which a 1% change in
price causes a corresponding 1% change in quantity and thus the incremental benefits of
DRR curtailment are exactly equal to costs.
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Figure 1.3: DRR curtailments in the PJM for January–September of 2011 and 2012
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The FERC estimates a potential peak load reduction from DRRs operating in organized
markets increased 16% from 2009 to 2010 to 31,700 MW. Furthermore, FERC Order No.
745 will likely have a profound effect on participation of DRRs in wholesale energy markets,
accelerating the current pace of DRR entrance. In many cases, the level of compensation
DRRs receive under the new rule, the LMP, will increase over current compensation levels,
providing additional incentives for DRR participation. Figure 1.3 shows the total monthly
DRR curtailments in the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland Interconnection (PJM )—
the first system operator to implement the threshold price requirement of FERC Order No.
745—for the first nine months of 2011 and 2012. Clearly, the implementation of the threshold
price requirement of the Order in the first months of 2012 had a significant impact on the
participation of DRRs compared to the same period in 2011 [8]. The impacts of the FERC
Order No. 745 on DRR participation are significant and so it is imperative that methods
for simulating the impacts of DRRs take the current regulatory environment into account.
In the past five years, curtailment service providers (CSPs) have emerged as third party
aggregators of smaller loads into quantities large enough to be offered as DRRs in wholesale
markets. Similar entities will likely emerge for ESRs, as the U.S. vehicle fleet moves towards
partially and fully electric vehicles, in order to harness the value of tens of thousands of
electric vehicle batteries for providing grid services. CSPs have significantly widened the
field of potential DRRs and have emerged as a major provider of DRRs in wholesale energy
markets [9] and ESR aggregators have the potential to do the same for ESRs. As the pool
of potential DR and ES resources grows, the need for tools to understand the economic
impacts of the deepening DR and ES resources penetrations also becomes greater.
1.2 Conceptual Aspects of DR and ES Resources
Physically, ES and DR resources may be viewed in many ways as substitutable resources—
both enable the ISO to shift load from peak to off-peak hours by providing a means of storing
energy. ESRs store energy directly, whether it be in a water reservoir for pumped hydro or a
chemical battery, and must charge at least every MWh they discharge and even more when
the efficiency of the unit is less than one. DRRs, on the other hand, provide energy storage
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by deferring or eliminating the use of energy and need not recover every MWh curtailed.
The amount of energy recovered depends on the process being curtailed or the preferences of
the customer providing the curtailment. In fact, DRRs may sometimes provide reductions
by utilizing on-site generators. If on-site generators provide for the DRR curtailment the
energy recovery may even reach zero, since no actual demand curtailment has occurred.
The main difference between ES and DR resources is the flexibility they offer to the
ISO. ESRs are simply treated as a generator when discharging (as a load when charging)
and are paid (pay) the LMP. If utilized as a system resource, ESRs are dispatched by the
ISO to have the greatest impact on the ISO ’s objective—typically the maximization of the
social surplus. However, while load recovery for DRR curtailments is still simply treated
as additional demand paid for at the LMP, compensation paid to DRRs for curtailments
since the issuance of FERC Order No. 745 is dictated by the threshold price condition.
Therefore, when utilized as a system resource, DRRs are also dispatched by the ISO to have
the greatest impact on the system objective, but their utilization is further constrained by
the threshold price condition. As mentioned above, DRRs need not recover every MWh of
energy curtailed—or may even recover more than the total MWh curtailment—which gives
DRRs an additional level of flexibility which ESRs do not have.
While, currently, participation in electricity markets by DR and ES resources remains low
compared to the quantity of supply-side resources, such as generators, the continued growth
of DR and ES resources and strong policy support for the integration of these resources into
wholesale electricity markets will likely result in deeper DR and ES penetrations in the near
future. These developments necessitate the creation of tools to assess the economic impacts
of DR and ES resources and studies which provide insights into the economic impacts of
deepening penetrations of DR and ES resources. Furthermore, the substitutability of DR
and ES resources in providing energy storage service to the system motivates a need develop
tools to quantify the market impacts of DR and ES resources and to study which resources
are most cost effective at providing energy storage service. Such tools provide electricity
grid stakeholders the necessary information to create policy for, and plan and operate, the
power system reliably and effectively.
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1.3 A Survey of the State of the Art
The utilization of ES and DR resources in the power system has been the topic of power
systems research for the past three decades. A number of papers and reports have outlined
conceptually, and to some degree quantified, the economic impacts of DR and ES resources.
In this section, we give an overview of the literature related to the assessment of the economic
impacts of DR and ES resources operating in wholesale electricity markets.
Utilities have a long history of utilizing ESRs, in the form of pumped hydro energy stor-
age, and demand-side management (DSM )—the predecessor to DRRs. In the vertically
integrated utility context, DSM and ESRs were used to improve the efficiency of generation
asset operation and reduce operational costs [10]. A number of operational strategies have
been proposed over the past two decades for the efficient utilization of DSM s and ESRs from
a cost reduction perspective [11].
In addition, utility planning and operations models have been proposed which take DSM
and ESRs into account [12]. There is a large body of work on optimization models for utility
planning, some of which have considered DSM and various forms of uncertainty [13]. Huang
et al. develop a model for DSM which considers seven load sectors and applies reductions
sector by sector to assess the impacts of demand reductions on the basis of each sector on
generator adequacy over longer-term periods in [14]. These works consider the utilization of
DSM and ES from the utility perspective and do not consider operations in the increasingly
prevalent market environment.
With the onset of electricity industry restructuring, which unbundled generation, trans-
mission, and retail electricity sales, and the introduction of organized wholesale electricity
markets, the roles of ESRs and the demand-side as resources for meeting the supply-demand
balance have changed. Until recently, DSM and ESRs were treated much as they were un-
der vertically integrated utilities. However, high prices, price volatility, supply-side market
power concerns and a glut of investment in new generation and transmission assets have
driven electricity grid stakeholders to again look towards the demand-side and ESRs to eco-
nomically meet the supply-demand balance and maintain system reliability. A high-level
framework for assessing the economic value of utilizing ERS s integration into electricity
11
markets and estimates of the market potential of various applications of utility-scale ESRs
is given in [2].
A number of works have explored the economic impacts ESRs in electricity markets [15],
[16], [17], [18]. Sioshansi et al. quantify the economic impacts of ESR capacity, capability,
and efficiency in backcast studies for the PJM for the years 2002–2007 [16]. They explore
the impacts of price-taker ESRs—those which do not impact the market clearing price—and,
to a more limited extent, the impacts of larger-scale ESRs. Lamont proposes a framework
to determine the optimal ESR capacity in [15]. Figueiredo et al. evaluate the economics
of ESRs in fourteen electricity markets for use in load shifting and exploitation of inter-
temporal arbitrage opportunities in [18]. These works, however, do not account for the
transmission-constrained network and do not evaluate the impacts of ESR penetrations
deeper than around one percent of the system peak load.
DSM has been replaced by incentive-based DRRs and dynamic pricing in the market en-
vironment. The benefits of utilizing DRRs to meet the supply-demand balance and enhance
the economic efficiency and reliability by increasing the effective elasticity of demand have
long been recognized [19]. Cappers et al. summarize the existing contribution of DRRs
in the U.S. electricity markets with a primary focus on enrollment and performance of
incentive-based DR programs in organized markets in [20]. Many economists favor exposing
retail consumers of electricity to wholesale prices under dynamic pricing schemes rather than
incentive-based DR programs to improve the efficiency of electricity markets. A case study
using a California utility found a potential peak reduction of 1% to 9% may be achieved
under such pricing schemes [21]. Another study calculates a 5% reduction in national peak
demand can yield operational cost savings of $3 billion/year, but does not take into account
the impacts of curtailed energy recovery [22].
The benefits of dynamic pricing and demand-side participation were clearly laid out in
the 1980s [23]. More recently, Spees et al. discussed empirical results which show the re-
sponsiveness of electricity consumers to price and demonstrate the significant potential of
demand-side reductions to assist in meeting the supply-demand balance in [24]. In recent
years there has been a focus among energy service providers and regulators on incentive
based DR programs. Bushnell et al. discuss the potential pitfalls of incentive based DR
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programs and highlight the benefits of dynamic pricing in [25]. Despite widespread agree-
ment about the greater economic efficiency of dynamic pricing over incentive-based DRRs,
political hurdles and lack of experience with dynamic pricing have led to a continued focus
on incentive-based DRRs.
DR and ES resources now fill the role of either a system resource or a merchant resource.
In either role, these resources offer reliability and economic benefits. However, the objective
of their operations has shifted from cost minimization to the maximization of social surplus,
when operated as a system resource, or the maximization of profit, when operated as a
merchant resource.
There is also a long history of work on integrating demand-side resources into the market
clearing in economic dispatch and unit commitment frameworks [26], [27]. More recently,
models which consider both energy and ancillary services and explicitly consider DRR cur-
tailment recovery energy have been proposed [28]. These works outline market clearing
mechanisms which explicitly account for DRRs.
Many existing as well as a number of newly built ESR facilities are operated by private
entities offering in ISO-run energy and ancillary service markets. Several works have focused
on strategies for merchant resources seeking to maximize profits in the wholesale market [29].
Researchers from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a method to generate
optimal bid schedules for a hybrid ESR systems (those systems which include a fast-response
component, such as a flywheel or battery, and a slow response component, such as a pumped-
hydro) participating in both energy and regulation service markets in [30]. Much of the work
in this area does not consider the transmission network or interactions with DRRs.
Until now there has been little work which discusses the conceptual and physical simi-
larities of DR and ES resources. We have not seen any work which represents DRRs as a
special case of ESRs in a comprehensive deterministic approach capable of quantifying the
economic impacts of ES and DR resources. Moreover, few studies have assessed in depth
the economic impacts of DR and ES resources on a transmission-constrained system. To
our knowledge, no studies have been published which compare the economic impacts of DR
and ES resources on the DAM s in a transmission-constrained system.
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1.4 The Scope and Nature of the Contributions of the Thesis
In this work, we provide a comparative economic assessment of the impacts of DR and ES
resources participating in the DAM s. In order to perform the assessment, we construct a
flexible market simulation approach which explicitly represents both ES and DR resources
and the transmission-constrained network and takes into account the current regulatory
environment.
In our studies, we consider multiple ISO-controlled DR and ES resources scheduled as a
system resources for inter-temporal energy arbitrage in the DAM s. Our studies are backcasts
and assume perfect knowledge of the loads. The ESR scheduling period is multi-day to
capture the periodic nature of the load shape. We also consider the requirements of the
recent FERC Order No. 745 on DRR scheduling. We consider all generators to be self-
committed and the demand in each hour to be inelastic.
This work makes several contributions to the state-of-the-art. Our flexible simulation ap-
proach represents the salient aspects of the DAM s and the current regulatory environment.
The engine of our approach is the EMCP. In the EMCP framework, we explicitly account for
ES and DR resources and the transmission-constrained network. Furthermore, we represent
DRRs as a special case of ESRs, which allows for the comparison of ES and DR resources
on equal footing. Our approach also allows the assessment of the impacts of DRR recovery
energy—an important, and often ignored, component of economic impacts of DRRs on the
DAM s. This flexible approach provides stakeholders a means to develop a deeper under-
standing of the economic impacts of integrated ES and DR resources participating in the
DAM s.
We apply the simulation approach to perform the comparative economic assessment of
the impacts of deepening capacity penetrations of ES and DR resources with their explicit
participation in DAM s using data from the ISO-NE andMISO. In our studies, we investigate
the reductions in ABLMP which result from the participation of ES and DR resources with
capacities penetrations in the 0% to 30% of system peak load range. We quantify the range
of benefits and limitations of integrated DR and ES resources with case studies on modified
IEEE 57- and 118-bus test systems (MTS57 and MTS118, respectively). We summarize our
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key insights as follows:
• ABLMPs reductions are the highest on the MTS57 for DR and ES resource penetra-
tions of 2% and 9%, respectively;
• ABLMPs reductions are the highest on the MTS118 for DR and ES resource penetra-
tions of 6% and 20%, respectively;
• the shape of the offer curve is an important factor determining the price impacts of
DR and ES resources: systems with a lower ratio of the elasticity of supply in the
curtailment/discharge periods to the elasticity of supply in the recover/charge periods
can accommodate deeper penetrations of DR and ES resources;
• the load shape is an important factor determining the price impacts of DR and ES
resources: systems with a higher ratio of load in peak periods to load in off-peak
periods can accommodate deeper penetrations of DR and ES resources; and
• the requirements of FERC Order No. 745, which limit the number of degrees of
freedom ISOs have in controlling DRRs by prescribing a system-wide curtailment
threshold price, are a principal factor in the reduced price effectiveness of DR as
compared to ES resources.
The flexible market simulation approach developed in this work provides electricity grid
stakeholders a means to perform a number of “what if” studies to analyze the economic
impacts of the various aspects of ES and DR resources on the DAM s. The results of such
studies provide useful information for planning, the development of operational procedures,
the formulation of effective policy to incentivize appropriate penetrations of ES and DR
resources and other electricity grid stakeholder decision making processes.
1.5 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis consists of four additional chapters and three appendices. In Chapter 2 we develop
models for ESRs and DRRs as a special case of ESRs. We then develop the EMCP which
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includes ES and DR resources and takes explicit account of the transmission-constrained
network.
In Chapter 3 we give an in-depth description of the flexible simulation approach which
is the basis of our DR and ES resource DAM economic impact comparative analysis. We
then describe implementation of the EMCP in the market simulation and the multi-day ESR
scheduling and DRR curtailment scheduling processes and discuss worthwhile applications
for the simulation approach.
In Chapter 4 we present representative results from the extensive studies we have carried
out on numerous systems using real MISO and ISO-NE data to perform the comparative
assessment of DR and ES resources. We find the deployment of ESRs has a greater impact on
reducing the ABLMP than DRRs at each penetration investigated, reducing the ABLMPs
by as much as 10% compared to the base case system with no deployed DR or ES resources.
DRRs, on the other hand, resulted in ABLMP reductions of at most 3% compared to the
base case due to the additional regulatory constraints in place for DRRs.
In Chapter 5 we summarize the main results of the thesis and point out directions for
future research. Appendix A provides a summary of notation used in the formulation of the
TCMCP. Appendix B contains the test-system data used in the case studies in Chapter 4.
In Appendix C we report the ABLMP reductions for all the sensitivity cases on the test
systems discussed in Chapter 4.
16
CHAPTER 2
THE INCORPORATION OF ES AND DR
RESOURCES IN THE
TRANSMISSION-CONSTRAINED MARKET
ENVIRONMENT
In this chapter we give an overview of our model for ESRs and apply the rationale from
our discussion of the conceptually and physical similarities between ES and DR resources to
represent DRRs as a special case of ESRs in the ESR model. We continue with a description
of the extensions to the MCP we make in order to incorporate ES and DR resources into
what we term the extended MCP (EMCP). We close by stating the EMCP and providing
some insights gained from the structure of the framework.
2.1 ES and DR Resource Models
In this section we develop the ESRs model to represent the salient aspects of ESRs in the
transmission-constrained market environment. We then describe how the ESR model can
be applied to represent DRRs as a special case of ESRs.
We consider a set of U storage units U = {u1, u2, . . . , uU}. Each unit u is fully specified
by the upper and lower bounds on its charge and discharge capacity, in MW, the upper and
lower bounds on its charge capability, in MWh, and its charge and discharge efficiencies.
We use the notation [ · ] after a variable to represent the discrete nature of the hourly DAM
quantities and define a set of H hours H = {h1, h2, . . . , hH}. For a storage unit u, let pu[h]
be the storage capacity (charge or discharge) at an hour h and let pu[h] > 0 when discharging
and pu[h] < 0 when charging. For clarity in formulating the problem we define
cu[h] =


−pu[h] if pu[h] < 0
0 otherwise
17
du[h] =


pu[h] if pu[h] > 0
0 otherwise
We denote for an hour h the charge capacity upper and lower bounds by cuM [h] and c
u
m[h],
respectively, the discharge capacity upper and lower bounds by duM [h] and d
u
m[h], respectively,
the upper and lower bounds on charge capability by yuM [h] and y
u
m[h] and the charge and
discharge efficiency to be ηuc and η
u
d , respectively. We define η
u
r = η
u
c η
u
d to be the ESR round
trip efficiency. The ESR capacity constraints are
cum[h] ≤ c
u[h] ≤ cuM [h] (2.1)
dum[h] ≤ d
u[h] ≤ duM [h] (2.2)
The stored energy in an ESR unit u at the beginning of an hour h is given by
yu[h] = yu[h0] +
h−1∑
i=h1
(
ηud c
u[i]−
du[i]
ηud
)
where yu[h0] is the initial stored energy. The stored energy constraints are
yum[h] ≤ y
u[h] ≤ yuM [h] (2.3)
The stored energy constraints are key. These so called “coupling constraints” couple the
hours of the DAM s. To integrate an additional degree of freedom for ESR control, we
introduce a constraint which governs the energy required to be in the storage reservoir in
hour hH ∑
h∈H
(
ηud c
u[i]−
αukd
u[i]
ηud
)
= 0 (2.4)
where αuk is the proportion of discharged energy which must be charged in unit u by hour
hH of a day k.
We represent DRRs with the ESR model by replacing u with b˜ and considering DRR
curtailment the analogue of ESR discharge and DRR recovery the analogue of ESR charge.
In line with Kowli in [31], we segment the set of buyers B into two non-overlapping subsets
to delineate the set of DRRs.
We denote the subset of buyers operating as pure buyers as B¯ and the subset of buyers
capable of providing DR by B˜ such that B = B˜ ∪ B¯ and B˜ ∩ B¯ = ∅. Furthermore,
we denote, in an hour h, pb¯[h] to be the load of a pure buyer b¯, pb˜[h] to be the load of a
DRR capable buyer b˜ and p˜b˜[h] the curtailment or recovered energy of DRR capable buyer
b˜, analogous to pu[h] for an ESR, such that pb˜[h] ≥ p˜b˜[h]. We define the set E = U ∪ B˜
indexed by e, to make the statement of the EMCP more compact.
In this section we have developed a model to represent ESRs and we showed how we may
represent DRRs with the ESR model as a special case of ESRs. In Section 2.2 we incorporate
the ES and DR resource models in into the MCP to develop the EMCP.
2.2 The Incorporation of ES and DR Resources in the MCP
In this section we describe the incorporation in of the ES and DR resource models into
the transmission constrained market framework. Our development of the market simulation
framework is based on two main assumptions:
A1. The network is lossless.
A2. The DC power flow assumptions hold.
Assumption A1 is reasonable in dense networks without long transmission lines. Assumption
A2 is standard for electricity market clearing and market simulation [32].
We consider a power system which consists of a set (N + 1) nodes N = {0, 1, . . . , N},
with the slack bus at node 0, and the set of L lines L = {`1, `2, . . . , `L}. We denote each
line by the ordered pair ` = (n,m) where n is the from node and m is the to node with
n,m ∈ N . Real power flow f` ≥ 0 whenever the flow is from n to m and f` < 0 otherwise.
We consider the system to be lossless and each node to be connected to at least one other
node. We denote the diagonal branch susceptance matrix by Bd ∈ R
L×L. Let A ∈ RL×N be
the reduced node incidence matrix for the subset of nodes N \ {0} and B ∈ RN×N be the
nodal susceptance matrix. We assume the network contains no phase shifting devices and so
B = BT . We denote the slack bus nodal susceptance vector by b0 = [b01, . . . , b0N ]
T ∈ RN .
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We use this network description to formulate the MCP for a set of S sellers S =
{s1, s2, . . . , sS} and a set of B buyers B = {b1, b2, . . . , bB} over a set of hours H , which we
denote by M¯ (H ,S ,B), as described by Liu and Gross in [33].
max
∑
h∈H
{∑
b∈B
Bb
(
pb[h]
)
−
∑
s∈S
Cs (ps[h])
}
s.t. pg[h]− pd[h] = Bθ[h] ↔ λ[h]
p
g
0[h]− p
d
0[h] = b
T
0 θ[h] ↔ λ0[h]
psm[h] ≤ p
s[h] ≤ psM [h] ↔ µ
s
M [h], µ
s
m[h] (2.5)
pbm[h] ≤ p
b[h] ≤ pbM [h] ↔ µ
b
M [h], µ
b
m[h]
fm[h] ≤ f [h] ≤ fM [h] ↔ ξM [h], ξm[h]
∀b ∈ B, ∀s ∈ S , ∀h ∈ H
where, for an hour h, ps[h] is the scheduled output of seller s, in MWh/h, bounded above
and below by psM [h] and p
s
m[h], respectively, p
b[h] is the scheduled consumption of buyer b
in MWh/h, which is bounded below by pbm[h] and above by p
b
M [h], C
s(ps[h]) is the integral
of seller s’s marginal offer price as a function of the scheduled output ps[h], Bb(pb[h]) is the
integral of buyer b’s marginal bid price as a function of scheduled consumption pb[h] and θ[h]
is the vector nodal voltage angles. The vector of line flows f [h] = [f`1[h], . . . , f`L[h]]
T ∈ RL
is given by
f [h] = BdAθ[h]
and is bounded above and below by the vectors of line flow limits fM [h] and fm[h], re-
spectively, pdn[h] =
∑
b∈B is
at node n
pb[h] is the sum of the withdrawals at a node n, pgn[h] =∑
s∈S is
at node n
ps[h] is the sum of the injections at a node n and
pd[h] =
[
pd1[h], p
d
2[h], . . . , p
d
N [h]
]T
∈ RN
pg[h] = [pg1[h], p
g
2[h], . . . , p
g
N [h]]
T ∈ RN
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are the vectors of withdrawals and injections at all nodes n ∈ N \ {0}. The variables to
the right of the two-headed arrows in Eq. (2.5) are the dual variables of their respective
constraints.
To incorporate ES and DR resources in this framework we define
cEn [h] =
∑
e∈E is
at noden
ce[h]
dEn [h] =
∑
e∈E is
at noden
de[h]
to be the total charge (recovery) and discharge (curtailment) quantities at a node n and
cE [h] =
[
cE1 [h], c
E
2 [h], . . . , c
E
N [h]
]T
∈ RN
dE [h] =
[
dE1 [h], d
E
2 [h], . . . , d
E
N [h]
]T
∈ RN
to be the vectors of nodal charge (recovery) and discharge (curtailment). With ES and DR
resources included, the power flow constraints may be restated as
(
pg[h] + dE [h]
)
−
(
pd[h] + cE [h]
)
= B θ[h]
For simplicity and without loss of generality we assume there are no DR or ES resources at
the slack node. We also define
D = S ∪ B¯ ∪ B˜ ∪ E
to make the statement of the EMCP more compact and make one additional assumption.
A3. The DR and ES resources are utilized as system resources ;
Due to this assumption, DR and ES resources are not represented in the objective function
of the EMCP. We extend the MCP in Eq. (2.5) with the constraints to represent ES, and
therefore DR, resources in Eqs. (2.1–2.4) and the modified power flow constraint in Eq.
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(2.2). We denote the EMCP by M (H ,D) and state it as follows:
max
∑
h∈H


∑
b¯∈B¯
Bb¯
(
pb¯[h]
)
+
∑
b˜∈B˜
Bb˜
(
pb˜[h]− db˜[h]
)
−
∑
s∈S
Cs (ps[h])

 (2.6)
s.t.
(
pg[h] + dE [h]
)
−
(
pd[h] + cE [h]
)
= Bθ[h] ↔ λ¯[h]
p
g
0[h]− p
d
0[h] = b
T
0 θ[h] ↔ λ¯0[h]
psm[h] ≤ p
s[h] ≤ psM [h] ↔ µ
s
M [h], µ
s
m[h]
pbm[h] ≤ p
b[h] ≤ pbM [h] ↔ µ
b
M [h], µ
b
m[h]
fm[h] ≤ f [h] ≤ fM [h] ↔ ξM [h], ξm[h]
cem[h] ≤ c
e[h] ≤ ceM [h] ↔ ν
e
m,c[h], ν
e
M,c[h]
dem[h] ≤ d
e[h] ≤ deM [h] ↔ ν
e
m,d[h], ν
e
M,d[h]
yem[h] ≤ y
e[h0] +
h−1∑
i=h0
(
ηecc
e[i]−
de[i]
ηed
)
≤ yeM [h] ↔ χ
e
M [h], χ
e
m[h]
∑
h∈H
(
ηecc
e[h]−
αekd
e[h]
ηed
)
= 0 ↔ φe
∀e ∈ E , ∀s ∈ S , ∀h ∈ H , ∀b ∈ B
The optimal solution toM (H ,D) is, ∀h ∈ H , the optimal seller outputs [ps[h]]? , ∀s ∈ S ,
the optimal pure buyer consumption
[
pb¯[h]
]?
, ∀b¯ ∈ B¯, the optimal DR-capable buyer con-
sumption
[
pb˜[h]
]?
, ∀b˜ ∈ B˜, the optimalDRR curtailment and recovery schedule
[
p˜b˜[h]
]?
, ∀b˜ ∈
B˜ and the optimal ES resource schedule [pu[h]]? , ∀u ∈ U . In addition, the optimal dual
variables associated with the power flow constraints [λn[h]]
?
, ∀n ∈ N provide the LMPs.
FERC Order No. 745 specifies the incentive payments to DRRs for reductions in demand
should be allocated proportionally to all entities that purchase from the relevant energy
market in area(s) where the demand response reduces the market price for energy at the
time when the demand response resource is committed or dispatched [7]. Considering this
requirement, we define λr[h] to be the system-wide threshold price for an hour h, λˆn[h] to
be the pre-curtailment LMP at a node n and ˆN [h] to be the subset of nodes of N where
λn[h] ≤ λˆn[h]. We may then define the additional charge to buyers at node n for DRR
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curtailments in an hour h
υn[h] =


∑
n∈N
[
dB˜n
]?
[λn[h]]
?
∑
n∈Nˆ [h]
([
pdn[h]
]?
−
[
dB˜n
]?) if n ∈ ˆN [h]
∑
n∈N
[
dB˜n
]?
[λn[h]]
?
∑
n∈N
([
pdn[h]
]?
−
[
dB˜n
]?) if ˆN [h] = ∅
0 otherwise
If Nˆ [h] = ∅ for an hour h, the costs of DRR curtailments are socialized to all loads on a
pro-rata basis.
The solution of the EMCP may be used to calculate the system metrics such as the
seller payments, pure and DR-capable buyer payments, the DRR payments and the ESR
payments. For an hour h, the total seller payments are
ρS [h] =
∑
n∈N
[pgn[h]]
? · [λn[h]]
? (2.7)
The total buyer payments are
ρB[h] =
∑
n∈N
([
pdn[h]
]?
−
[
dB˜n [h]
]?)
· ([λn[h]]
? + υn[h]) (2.8)
The incentive payments to DRRs for curtailed energy are
ρB˜d [h] =
∑
n∈N
[
dB˜n [h]
]?
· [λn[h]]
? (2.9)
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and the payments by DRRs for recovered energy are
ρB˜c [h] =
∑
n∈N
[
cB˜n [h]
]?
· [λn[h]]
? (2.10)
We also define the payments to ESRs for discharged energy
ρUd [h] =
∑
n∈N
[
dUn [h]
]?
· [λn[h]]
? (2.11)
and the payments by ESRs for charged energy
ρUc [h] =
∑
n∈N
[
cUn [h]
]?
· ([λn[h]]
? + υn[h]) (2.12)
In this section we described the incorporation of the ES and DR resource models into the
comprehensive EMCP framework. In Section 2.3 we highlight the notable aspects of the
EMCP framework.
2.3 Salient Aspects of the EMCP Framework
In this section we discuss the salient aspects of the EMCP framework. The EMCP we have
formulated in this chapter is a flexible and comprehensive platform on which to develop our
deterministic simulation approach. The framework can represent the markets over various
time periods, allowing us to formulate not only the DAM s but also to apply the EMCP
framework to develop longer-term ESR schedules. The linear formulation of the power flow
equations is consistent with industry market simulation practice and allows us to represent
larger systems over longer-term time periods and still obtain a solution in a reasonable
amount of time. Furthermore, the generality of our formulation can be easily extended to
incorporate renewable resources and their various sources of uncertainty—an area for future
work.
There are also some challenges which arise from our formulation. Assumption A2 dictates
our linear formulation with the associated computational speed benefits. However, this
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assumption may not hold for some systems, which restricts the applicability of the framework
to some degree. Assumption A3 does not allow for offers and bids from DR and ES resources
with this framework. However, the explicit representation of private DR and ES player offers
and bids is another easily obtainable extension of this work and so another opportunity for
future research.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter we developed a model for ESRs and showed how DRRs may be represented
in the ESR model as a special case of ESRs. We then formulated the EMCP to explicitly
represent ES and DR resources in the transmission-constrained market environment and
described the salient aspects of the EMCP framework. In the Chapter 3 we describe the
implementation of the EMCP into a simulation approach capable of quantifying the economic
impacts of ES and DR resources.
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CHAPTER 3
SIMULATION METHODOLOGY
In this chapter we describe the implementation of the EMCP framework formulated in Chap-
ter 2 into a flexible deterministic simulation approach which is the basis of our comparative
economic assessment of the impacts of DR and ES resources on the DAM s. In the approach,
we apply the EMCP to simulate the DAM s for a given physical system, market structure,
and regulatory environment to determine the market outcomes and assess the impacts of a
number of salient DR and ES resource characteristics. Furthermore, our approach integrates
multi-day ESR scheduling and the requirements of the recent FERC Order No. 745.
We begin this chapter with an overview of the key aspects of our simulation. Next we
describe the DRR curtailment and multi-day ESR scheduling processes. We continue with
a description of the complete simulation approach. We close with a discussion of several
applications of interest for the approach including DRR energy recovery, ESR efficiency,
carbon emissions impacts and the impacts of deepening capacity penetrations of DR and ES
resources.
3.1 Overview of the Simulation Approach
In this section, we provide an overview of the deterministic simulation approach which is the
basis of our comparative economic assessment of the impacts of DR and ES resources on
the DAMs. The EMCP framework formulated in Chapter 2 is the engine of our simulation
approach. The approach explicitly represents DR and ES resources in the transmission-
constrained market environment and captures the economic impacts of ES and DR resources
participation in the DAM s over multiple timescales. Moreover, we utilize the EMCP to
integrate multi-day ESR scheduling the requirements of the recent FERC Order No. 745
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into our simulation approach. Our simulation approach is applicable to systems with a wide
range of physical, market and regulatory characteristics. We refer to these characteristics
collectively as the system description.
The time-period over which we apply the approach to perform a study we call the study
period. To capture the economic impacts of interest on time scales smaller than the study
period, we segment the study period into T non-overlapping simulation periods and denote
by
T = {t : t = 1, . . . , T}
the index set of the simulation periods. We assume the system description remains un-
changed over each simulation period but may change between simulation periods. We seg-
ment each simulation period t into K non-overlapping daily subperiods and denote by
Kt = {k : k = k1, . . . , kK}
The index set of the daily subperiods. We show the segmentation of the study period into
simulation periods and daily subperiods in Fig. 3.1. We are interested in the assessment of
period 1 · · · period t · · · period T
daily subperiod k1 · · · daily subperiod kK
study period
Figure 3.1: segmenting the study period into simulations periods and daily subperiods
the impacts of DR and ES resources on the DAM s and so the daily subperiod is the basic
time unit of the simulations. However, each set of DAM s consists of 24 hourly markets and
so we segment daily subperiod k into 24 non-overlapping hourly subperiods and denote by
Hk = {h : h = h1, . . . , h24}
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the indexed set of hourly subperiods. The hourly subperiod is the smallest indecomposable
time unit in our simulation approach. As such, all intra-hourly phenomenon, such as short-
term system dynamics, are ignored.
For each daily subperiod k we execute two-pre market processes
1. The curtailment scheduling process in which the pre-curtailment LMPs are compared
to the system-wide threshold price to determine the DRR curtailments in the current
day’s markets; and
2. The ESR scheduling process to determine the multi-day ESR schedules which in turn
determine the hours of charge and discharge for, and the stored energy at the end of,
the current day’s markets.
We employ the outcomes of these processes to determine additional schedule information
∀h ∈ Hk which is used to constrain the operation of DR and ES resources in the day k
DAM s. With this scheduling information we utilize the EMCP formulated in Chapter 2
with a given system description to simulate the day k DAM s.
The DAM s outcomes are the resource quantities and prices ∀h ∈ Hk. We use the DAM
outcomes for each daily subperiod k ∈ Kt to assess the DAM economic impacts of ES and
DR resources for simulation period t. We then aggregate the economic impacts for each
t ∈ T to evaluate the study period impacts.
In this section we have developed the core aspects of a comprehensive deterministic ap-
proach to simulating the impacts of DR and ES resources on the DAM s. In Sections 3.1.1
and 3.1.2 we describe the DRR curtailment and ESR scheduling processes in greater detail.
Then in Section 3.1.3 we give a detailed summary of the market simulation at each subperiod
k.
3.1.1 The Pre-Market Curtailment Scheduling Process
The key requirement of FERC Order No. 745 related to DRR market scheduling is the
application the threshold price criterion for determining the DRR compensation. As de-
scribed in Section 1.1, the threshold price criterion determines if DRRs are compensated at
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the LMP. In this section we describe the implementation of the threshold price criteria into
a curtailment scheduling process in our simulation approach using the EMCP.
The threshold prices are determined monthly on the basis of the seller offers, the fuel prices
and the ISO generation mix. A detailed description of the process by which the threshold
prices are determined is given in [34].
Given the threshold price, we may determine the DRR curtailments. An overview of the
curtailment scheduling process is shown in Fig. 3.2. We first run the DAM s without DR
M¯ (Hk,S ,B)
λ¯n[h], ∀h ∈
Hk, ∀n ∈ N
period t system
description
∀h ∈ Hk,
∀n ∈ N ,
λn[h] ≥ λ
r[h]?
db˜m[h], d
b˜
M [h] = d
b˜
M [h]d
b˜
m[h], d
b˜
M [h] = 0
day k DRR
curtailments
yes
no
Figure 3.2: An overview of the curtailment scheduling process for a daily subperiod k
or ES resources to determine the DRR curtailments in a daily subperiod k. We indicate
the outcomes of M¯ (Hk,S ,B) by an over bar. The solution to M¯ (Hk,S ,B) provides
us the LMPs, λ¯[h] ∈ RN , which we compare on a nodal basis to the threshold price λr[h].
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Assuming DRRs offer their maximum curtailment quantity, if for a node n, λ¯n ≥ λ
r[h],
then all cleared DRR curtailments offered at node n are accepted and we fix the curtailment
quantities by fixing the curtailment bounds
db˜m[h], d
b˜
M [h] =


db˜M [h] if λ¯n ≥ λ
r[h], for n : b˜ is at n
0 otherwise
The hourly curtailments are used with the recovered energy proportion αb˜k to determine
the total curtailed energy recovered over the day according to the right-hand side of the
constraint in Eq. (2.4), ∀b˜ ∈ B˜:
∑
h∈H
cb˜[h] = αb˜k
∑
h∈H
db˜[h]
The curtailment quantities are inputs to, and the recovered energy quantities become con-
straints in, the day k DAM s. In this section we have described the curtailment scheduling
process which integrates the requirements of FERC Order No. 745 into the scheduling
approach. We now turn to the development of the multi-day ESR schedules.
3.1.2 The Pre-Market ESR Scheduling Process
In this work we consider utility-scale ESRs with capabilities on the order of MW-weeks.
Such ESRs have the capability to shift energy across time periods of hours or days. To
realize the economic potential of MW-week scale ESRs to the fullest extent possible, the
ESR scheduling period must be commensurate with the ESR capability.
If MW-week capability ESRs are scheduled in the DAM s without consideration of the
future days, information about the opportunities for discharge and charge in those future
days are not taken into consideration in the ESR schedule. As such, the ESR is used only
to have the greatest impact on the ISO objective in the current day’s DAM s and not the
greatest impact overall. For example, if the ESR scheduling period is seven days, an ESR
may store energy during the highest priced hours of the weekend days because the prices
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in these hours are much lower than the weekday peak period prices. However, if the ESR
scheduling period is only a one day, the current DAM s , the same ESR will discharge in
the highest price hours of the current day, be it a weekend or weekday, since those hours
present the greatest opportunity with the available information. In this section we describe
the implementation of the EMCP into the multi-day ESR scheduling process.
To account for the longer-term ESR discharge opportunities, we consider an m + 1 day
ESR schedule. To formulate the m + 1 day ESR schedule on day k, we use Eq. (2.6) with
the ordered set of hours Hk,m =
⋃k+m
i=k Hi. The multi-day ES resource scheduling process
is summarized in Fig. 3.3. We indicate outcomes from M (Hk,m,D) with an over bar. The
M (Hk,m,D)
period t system
description
day k ESR
charge/discharge
hours, final
stored energy
Figure 3.3: The multi-day ESR schedule
solution to M (Hk,m,D) provides us the ESR charge and discharge quantities ∀h ∈ Hk for
each storage unit u:
[c¯u]? = [[c¯u[h1]]
?
, [c¯u[h2]]
?
, . . . , [c¯u[hH ]]
?]
T
∈ RH[
d¯
u]?
=
[[
d¯u[h1]
]?
,
[
d¯u[h2]
]?
, . . . ,
[
d¯u[hH ]
]?]T
∈ RH
We use the charge and discharge quantities to constrain the operation of the ESRs in the
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DAM s. Each ESR is constrained to charge, discharge, and idle as determined in the multi-
day schedule, and thus we fix the charge and discharge variables in the DAM s such that
dum[h], d
u
M [h] =


0 if [c¯u[h]]? > 0
dum[h], d
u
M [h] otherwise
cum[h], c
u
M [h] =


0 if
[
d¯u[h]
]?
> 0
cum[h], c
u
M [h] otherwise
In addition, we fix the stored energy in the DAMs for each ESR at the value determined by
the multi-day schedule allowing only the intra-day rescheduling of the charge and discharge
quantities. We do so by setting the value of αu
αuk =
h24∑
i=h1
ηuc [c¯
u[i]]?
h24∑
i=h1
[
d¯u[i]
]?
ηud
(3.1)
Application of the constraint given in Eq. (3.1) ensures the ESRs keep to the multi-day
schedule in the DAM s even though the DAM s time horizon is only 24 hourly markets. In
this section we described the multi-day ESR schedule and the integration of information
from the multi-day ESR scheduling process into the DAM simulations. In Section 3.1.3 we
give a detailed summary of the DAM simulations for a daily subperiod.
3.1.3 The DR and ES Resource Market Economic Impact Simulation
Approach
In this section we describe the combination of the pre-market processes described in Sections
3.1.1 and 3.1.2 to describe the complete DAM market simulation. The market simulation
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approach utilizes the EMCP in Eq. (2.6) as its engine to simulate the DAM s taking explicit
account of DR and ES resources and the transmission constrained network.
An overview of the market simulation approach for a day k is shown in Fig. 3.4. For each
day k DRR cur-
tailment scheduling
day k ESR scheduling
pre-market ES and DR resource scheduling processes
day k ESR
charge/discharge
hours, final
stored energy
day k DRR
curtailments
day k DAM s simulation
period t system
description
day k market
outcomes
Figure 3.4: Overview the DAM s simulation approach for a day k
day k in the simulation period, we first determine the DRR curtailment and the ESR charge
and discharge hours and final stored energy from the respective pre-market processes. This
DR and ES resource schedule information, along with the period t system description, are
the inputs to the day k market simulation. The market outcomes are the ESR charge and
discharge quantities, the DRR recovery quantities, and the seller quantities for each hour of
day k. This process is repeated for each simulation period t ∈ T .
From day k market outcomes we calculate the ES and DR resource payments, the seller
payments, and the buyer payments using Eqs. (2.7)–(2.12). The resource payments are
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then used to calculate other economic figures of merit which form the basis of an economic
assessment.
3.2 Applications of the Simulation Approach
The simulation approach based on our EMCP formulation and developed in this chapter is
highly flexible and may be used to study the economic impacts of a number of salient DR
and ES resources characteristics and represent a variety of ESR technologies. In this section,
we give an overview of several applications of interest including DRR energy recovery, ESR
efficiency, carbon emissions impacts and the impacts of deepening capacity penetrations of
DR and ES resources.
The price reductions from DRR curtailments are only one component of the economic
impacts of DRR utilization. Since in many cases, the energy curtailed in peak hours will
be recovered in off-peak hours, the economic impacts of DRR curtailed energy recovery
are an important second component of the overall DRR economic impacts. In some cases
of DRR curtailment, such as the curtailment of energy for lighting or the use of back-up
generation, the energy curtailed may be greater than the energy recovered. Conversely, the
energy curtailed may be less than the recovered energy. The economic impacts of DRR
energy recovery have been the subject of few studies. The approach presented here has the
capability to quantify the range of economic impacts which would occur for various levels
of DRR curtailed energy recovery by adjusting the values of the DRR parameters αb˜k. Such
studies shed light on the full economic impacts of DRR utilization.
The round trip efficiency of ESRs is an important factor determining the magnitude of the
economic impacts of ESRs. The ESR efficiency governs the ratio of the maximum charge
price to the minimum discharge price an ESR may pay over a specified period to operate
economically. The greater the efficiency, the greater the ratio of the maximum charge price
to the minimum discharge price and the greater the number of hours the ESR may operate
economically. We may use the approach to study the economic impacts of varying the
efficiency of ESRs by varying the values of parameters ηuc and η
u
d to adjust the round trip
efficiency ηur and quantify the range of ESR efficiency economic impacts.
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Concerns about climate change have driven state and federal policy that aims to reduce
carbon emissions in the electricity sector. The electricity sector accounts for around 40% of
U.S. carbon emissions [35] and so will be an important part of any meaningful strategy to
reduce national carbon emissions. ES and DR resources have an important role to play in the
reduction in system-wide carbon emissions in the electricity sector. Given the generation mix
of a particular system, the approach presented here allows the study of the carbon emissions
impacts of ES and DR resources along the same dimensions as the economic assessment and
provide system operators and policymakers insights to develop operational strategies and
policy to effectively reduce system wide carbon emissions.
The economic impacts of deepening DR and ES resource penetration are of increasing
interest to electricity grid stakeholders. Our market simulation approach has the capability
to perform DR and ES resource capacity penetration studies by varying the DR and ES
resource capacity bound constraints to observe the economic impacts of deepening resource
capacity penetrations. These studies allow policy makers and resource planners to answer
questions such as “How much ESR (DRR) is too much?” and identify incentive structures to
encourage new resource development appropriate ESR (DRR) penetrations. We present the
results of our comparative economic assessment of DR and ES resource capacity penetration
impacts on the DAM s in Chapter 4.
In this Section we gave an overview of some worthwhile applications of the flexible market
simulation approach. In Section 3.3 we summarize the approach discussed here.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter we described the implementation of the EMCP into a flexible market simula-
tion approach which explicitly represents both ES and DR resources and the transmission-
constrained network over multiple timescales and takes into account the current regulatory
environment. We then described the development of the curtailment and multi-day ESR
scheduling processes. We ended this chapter with description of the complete simulation
approach and an overview of some worthwhile applications. In Chapter 4 we describe the
application of the simulation approach to perform the comparative economic assessment of
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the impacts of deepening DR and ES resource penetration on the DAM s.
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CHAPTER 4
CASE STUDIES
In this chapter we present illustrative results from the extensive studies of the economic im-
pacts of DR and ES resources on the DAM s we have performed on numerous test systems
using MISO and ISO-NE data. We compare DR and ES resources side-by-side and demon-
strate the sensitivity of ABLMP to deepening DR and ES resource penetrations. Through
comparison of illustrative results from two of the test systems, we develop some intuition
about the system characteristics which affect the impacts of deepening DR and ES resource
penetrations. We identify the key factors, such as the load shape and the seller offers, which
contribute to the magnitude of the price impacts of DR and ES resources. Moreover, we
focus on the limitations of DRRs which lessen their price impacts compared to ESRs and
interpret the economic impacts of the constraints imposed on DR and ES resources in our
model.
We begin this chapter by describing the objective and nature of our case studies and the
test systems used. We then proceed to describe our findings and the insights gained from
our case studies. We conclude the chapter with a summary of the key findings.
4.1 The Test Systems and the Nature of the Case Studies
The illustrative results we present in this thesis are drawn from case studies on modified
IEEE 57- and 118-bus test systems (MTS57 and MTS118, respectively) [36]. To gain a
better understanding of the economic impacts of ES and DR resources in the DAM s, we
use market and load data from the MISO and the ISO-NE for the year 2010 [37], [38].
We observe little variation in the seller offer data on time-scales less than a month, so
we average the ISO offer data over each month on an hourly basis to construct 12 average
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hourly ISO supplier offer curves. This process reduces the computational burden of hourly
offer changes while preserving the seasonality effects on the seller offers. The test system
seller offer prices and quantities are replaced with the twelve 2010 ISO average hourly offer
data for each respective month of the one year simulation. We assume the supplier offers
change on a monthly basis but are the same in every hour of a month. Furthermore, we
assume the buyers have an arbitrarily high willingness to pay in each hour.
In both systems, we modify the line flow limits to induce transmission congestion in peak-
load periods. The load data and the total installed generation capacity from each ISO are
scaled to 9600 MW peak and 9960 MW, respectively. We place the DRRs in both systems
at all the load buses in proportion to the bus peak load. We place four equally sized ESRs
located at each of the four buses with the largest load concentration in each system. We
summarize test system specific modifications in Table 4.1. The full set of market and network
Table 4.1: Test system modifications for the case studies
test system
offer & load data
source
# of generators ESR buses
MTS57 MISO 25 6, 8, 9, 12
MTS118 ISO-NE 54 15, 59, 80, 116
data and the one-line diagram for each of the modified systems are presented in Appendix
B, and the load data may be obtained from [37] and [38].
The total DR and ES resource capacity penetrations in each case are calculated as a
percentage of the annual peak load. From here on, reference to resource penetration is
synonymous with resource capacity penetration unless otherwise noted.
We perform DRR capacity sensitivity studies for penetrations from 0 to 15% on each of
the MTS57 and MTS118. The capacity of each DRR is the product of the percent DRR
penetration and the load at the respective bus in the system peak load hour. DRRs are
assumed to recover energy at a capacity no greater than their curtailment capacity and
we assume 100 percent of curtailed energy is recovered in all cases. We assume DRRs
offer curtailments at the threshold price in the curtailment scheduling process so that the
threshold price extends from compensation to dispatch. We restrict DRR curtailments to
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between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., both because DRRs are unlikely to curtail
in off-peak hours so as to allow for energy recovery and because off-peak curtailment is rare
due to low load and prices in off-peak hours. Moreover, we assume DRRs recover curtailed
energy in the same 24 hour period (midnight to midnight) in which it was curtailed. We
assume the DRRs are operated as a system resource and so submit curtailment quantities to
the ISO for those hours in which curtailments are permitted and allow the ISO to schedule
the recovered energy. We assume there are no ESRs in the DRR sensitivity cases.
We perform ESR capacity sensitivity studies for penetrations from 0 to 15% on theMTS57
and 0 to 35% on the MTS118. The combined capacity of the four ESRs divided by the peak
load is equal to the percent penetration for the case under consideration and the storage
capability of the ESRs is considered to be 24 times the capacity. We assume the ESRs
have a round trip efficiency of 0.8. Such capabilities and efficiencies are consistent with
commercial pumped hydro and compressed-air ESRs [39]. We select a three-day time period
for the pre-market ESR schedule. Additionally, we do not consider additional cases of ESR
capability or efficiency in this work leaving the sensitivity of ABLMP to changes in the ESR
capability and efficiency as a topic for future research. We assume there are no DRRs in the
ESR sensitivity cases.
The objectives of the sensitivity studies presented here are to
• explore the limitations of the reductions in ABLMP which are achieved by deepening
penetrations of DR and ES resource capacity; and
• compare the price impacts of DR vs. ES resources at each penetration.
We compare the economic impacts of DR and ES resources on the DAM s on the basis of
capacity. The studies are backcast scenarios for the year 2010 with deepening penetrations
of DR and ES resources assuming perfect knowledge of the load. Each simulation does not
account for any sources of uncertainty and so all the case studies are deterministic.
Through our extensive studies, we have determined the ABLMP to be an effective metric
for measuring the economic impacts of DR and ES resources on the DAM s. The ABLMP
is defined to be the ratio of the total buyer payments over a specified period to the total
purchased quantity over the same period. The ABLMP is our primary metric of comparison
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in our comparative assessment. A complete set of ABLMP reduction results from our studies
is given in Appendix C.
We denote each case by Pki,j where k is the case test system, i is the penetration of DRRs
and j is the penetration of ESRs. The case with no DR or ES resources, Pk0,0 , is taken
as the base case scenario for each system. When evaluating the seasonal impacts of DR
and ES resources, we consider the spring period to encompass the months of March, April
and May; the summer period to encompass the months of June, July and August; the fall
period to encompass the months of September, October, and November; and winter period
to encompass the months of December, January and February.
In this section we gave an overview of the test systems used for our case studies and
discussed the nature of the studies. In Section 4.2 we describe the impacts ESR on ABLMPs
and the system characteristics which make ESR more or less effective.
4.2 The Economic Impacts of ESRs
In this section we discuss the economic impacts of deepening ESR penetration on the annual
ABLMPs in the two test systems. In addition, we break down the impacts seasonally to
analyze the differences across the seasons and gain insight into the characteristics of the load
and generator offers which contribute to the price impacts of ESRs. Moreover, we discuss
the price impacts of multi-day ESR scheduling.
Table 4.2 summarizes the ABLMP reductions from deepening ESR penetrations seasonally
and annually for the MTS57. Figure 4.1 depicts the annual ABLMPs for deepening ESR
penetrations. From Fig. 4.1 we note a maximum annual ABLMP reduction of around
2.4% which occurs at an ESR penetrations of 13% or deeper. There is, however, tremendous
variability in the ABLMP reductions between the summer and other seasons driven by
differences in the loads and the generator offers. ESRs have the highest price impact in the
summer where the greatest ABLMP reduction is 7.6% at 13% ESR penetration. ESRs have
the least price impact in the winter where the greatest ABLMP reduction is around 0.2%
at ESR penetrations of 5% or deeper. ESRs also show limited price impacts in the spring
and fall which is comparable to that of the winter.
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Table 4.2: The seasonal and annual ABLMP reductions for deepening penetrations of
ESRs on the MTS57
average buyer LMP reduction (%)
ESR penetration
(%)
spring summer fall winter annual
1 0.06 1.97 0.07 0.08 0.61
3 0.16 4.14 0.14 0.12 1.27
5 0.22 5.54 0.22 0.23 1.74
7 0.30 6.39 0.29 0.22 2.02
9 0.32 6.90 0.30 0.20 2.17
11 0.31 7.40 0.34 0.16 2.31
13 0.30 7.60 0.33 0.23 2.39
15 0.29 7.54 0.39 0.23 2.39
0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
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Figure 4.1: The annual ABLMP for deepening penetrations of ESRs on the MTS57
To illustrate and explain the seasonality impacts on ES resource utilization, we use the
hourly LMPs and the hourly loads for representative summer and winter weeks at a repre-
sentative system bus. We focus on the summer and winter ESR impacts to illustrate the
range of impacts observed in our studies. We show in Figs. 4.2 and 4.3 the hourly LMPs
and the hourly loads for the representative summer week of August 9–15 for sensitivity cases
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Figure 4.2: The hourly LMPs at bus 12 for the week of Aug. 9–15, 2010, on the MTS57
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Figure 4.3: The hourly loads for the week of Aug. 9–15, 2010, on the MTS57
P
57
0,0, P
57
0,1 and P
57
0,10 at bus 12.
One of the primary drivers of the ABLMP reductions resulting from ESR utilization is the
relationship between the load in the peak periods, when ESRs typically discharge resulting
price reductions, and the load in the off-peak periods, when ESRs typically charge resulting
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in price increases. As depicted in Fig. 4.3, the summer peak-period loads are as much
as twice the off-peak period loads. The significant variations in the loads drive significant
variations in the prices. As shown in Fig. 4.2, in case P570,0 there are peak- to off-peak period
price differences of as high as $250. As the penetration of ESRs is increased from case P570,0 to
P
57
0,1 and then to case P
57
0,10, the peak prices fall a disproportionately greater amount than the
off-peak prices rise as a result of ESR discharge and charge, respectively. It is precisely these
disproportionate peak price decreases compared to off-peak price increases combined with
the high peak to off-peak load ratio that results in reductions in the ABLMPs. Indeed, in
case P570,1 there is almost no impact on the off-peak prices while the peak prices fall by as much
as $70. Even in case P570,10, the increase in off-peak prices is about a tenth of the decrease
in peak prices. Such differences result in the approximately 7% reduction in the summer
period ABLMPs for case P570,10, despite increases in the off-peak LMPs. The pronounced
ESR LMP impacts in the summer week are contrasted by the lesser ESR LMP impacts in
the representative winter week. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 depict the LMP and the loads for the
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Figure 4.4: The hourly LMPs at bus 12 for the week of Dec. 13–19, 2010, on the MTS57
representative winter week of December 13–19, 2010, for cases P570,0, P
57
0,1 and P
57
0,10 at bus
12. We note the load variability in the winter week, shown in Fig. 4.5, and consequently
the price fluctuations, shown in Fig. 4.4, are less pronounced than those of the summer
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Figure 4.5: The hourly loads for the week of Dec. 13–19, 2010, on the MTS57
week discussed above. In fact, the maximum peak to off-peak load ratio and maximum
peak to off-peak price difference do not exceed 1.5 and $30, respectively, in case P570,0. The
lack of a significant peak to off-peak price difference and the low peak to off-peak load ratio
leave fewer opportunities for ESRs to reduce ABLMPs. Because the ESRs have a round
trip efficiency of less than one, 0.8 in our studies, each charge and discharge cycle results
in some lost energy. To overcome the cost of the lost energy, there must be a differential
between the maximum ESR charge price and the minimum ESR discharge price. Clearly,
the minimum differential is not often met in the winter weeks, as is clear from the limited
ABLMP reductions which result from the utilization of ESRs in the winter week and the
similarity between the load shape in each of the cases shown in Fig. 4.5.
Table 4.3 summarizes the average buyer LMP reductions for deepening penetrations of ES
resources seasonally and annually for the MTS118. Figure 4.6 depicts the annual ABLMPs
for deepening ESR penetrations. We note in Fig. 4.6, as before in Fig. 4.1, the annual
ABLMPs decreases monotonically with deepening ESR penetration, but at a decreasing rate.
The seasonality effects on the ABLMP impacts of ESR integration are even more pronounced
in theMTS118 cases than they are in theMTS57 cases. The highest ABLMP reduction in the
summer period is around 15% with respect to a 20% or deeper ESR penetration. The annual
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Table 4.3: The seasonal and annual ABLMP reductions for deepening penetrations of
ESRs on the MTS118
average buyer LMP reduction (%)
ESR penetration
(%)
spring summer fall winter annual
1 0.77 1.96 1.77 1.10 1.46
2 1.54 3.66 3.51 2.03 2.76
5 2.63 8.26 6.79 4.32 5.81
8 3.24 11.40 8.54 5.37 7.61
11 3.50 13.11 9.41 5.50 8.41
14 3.74 13.92 9.69 5.79 8.86
17 3.79 14.50 10.30 5.55 9.08
20 3.78 14.97 10.37 5.51 9.25
25 3.73 14.80 10.38 5.63 9.22
30 3.28 14.98 10.63 5.39 9.18
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Figure 4.6: The annual ABLMP for deepening penetrations of ESRs on the MTS118
ABLMP reduction with ESRs is around 9.2% and remains so for penetrations deeper than
20%, indicating that the peak to off-peak price differentials required for economic storage
operation are no longer present at these penetrations. The ABLMP reductions in the fall
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are similar to those of the summer. However, in the winter and spring periods the ABLMPs
impacts of ESRs are less than half those of the fall and summer. The ABLMP reductions
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Figure 4.7: The hourly LMPs at bus 59 for the week of Dec. 13–19, 2010, on the MTS118
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Figure 4.8: The hourly loads at bus 59 for the week of Dec. 13–19, 2010, on the MTS118
in all of the seasons can be explained using the same rationale as we used for the MTS57
cases.
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To illustrate the impacts of the multi-day storage schedule and the ESR efficiency, we
depict in Figs. 4.7 and 4.8 the hourly LMPs and the hourly loads for the representative
winter week of December 13–19, 2010, for cases P1180,0 , P
118
0,1 and P
118
0,20 at bus 59. The ratio of
peak to off-peak load in the winter week of case P1180,0 , depicted in Fig. 4.8, is approximately
1.5, a value similar to the winter week in P570,0. In addition, the peak to off-peak period
price difference for case P1180,0 is approximately $70 as seen in Fig. 4.7. Though the winter
week peak to off-peak load ratio on the MTS118 is similar to that of the winter week on
the MTS57, the peak to off-peak price differential is nearly twice as large on the MTS118.
The greater price differential allows the ESRs to overcome the efficiency losses to operate
and account for the higher winter week ABLMP reductions observed in MTS118 compared
to MTS57 with deepening ESR penetrations. Though the ESRs typically do not operate
without a minimum peak to off-peak price differential in the DAM s, we observe cases where
this tenant is violated.
Due to the multi-day ESR schedule, described in Section 3.1.2, there are days when the
ESRs operate uneconomically in order to take advantage of higher prices on future days.
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 provide a closer look at the hourly LMPs and the hourly loads for
December 19, 2010, at the same bus.
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Figure 4.9: The hourly bus 59 LMPs for December 19, 2010, on the MTS118
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Figure 4.10: The hourly loads for December 19, 2010, on the MTS118
As shown in Fig. 4.9, the LMPs are mostly impacted in the off-peak hours indicating
the ESRs are primarily charging. The LMP changes are reflected in the load increases from
charging in those hours in Fig. 4.10. Clearly, the payments for charge energy are greater
than the payments received for discharge on December 19th since there are only two hours
of discharge. However, we note the periodic nature of the prices. In Fig. 4.7, for example,
the prices on Monday and Tuesday, the first and second days depicted, are greater than
the prices on Sunday, the seventh day depicted. The three-day ESR schedule performed on
December 19th, a Sunday, includes price information for following two days, a Monday and
Tuesday, and thus the units maintain a higher stored energy on the 19th, resulting in net
payments by the ESRs for purchased energy, such that they have the capability to discharge
in more hours on the 20th and 21st when the prices are higher. While this information
results in short-term uneconomic ESR operation, without a multi-day look ahead for the
ESR schedule, such opportunities to store energy on a day with lower prices to discharge
on a future day with higher prices, and therefore realize a greater amount of the economic
potential of ESRs , would be lost.
From these results we conclude that significant price variations from peak to off-peak
driven in part by a high ratio of peak to off-peak loads are the principal contributing factors
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to the larger reductions in ABLMPs seen in the summer period at all penetrations of ESR
as compared to other seasons. Overall, we observe annual ABLMP reductions of at most
2.39% at 13% ESR penetration and 9.25% at 20% ESR penetration on the MTS57 and the
MTS118, respectively. In the following section, we discuss the impact of the generator offers
in greater detail where we compare the systematic differences between the MTS57 and the
MTS118 which lead to the differences in the ESR ABLMP impacts.
4.3 System Properties Contributing to the Price Impacts of ESRs
The ABLMP reduction impacts of ESR on the MTS57 are around a quarter of the those for
each ESR penetration level on the MTS118. The systematic differences between the impacts
in the two systems suggest there are some underlying system characteristics which effect the
price impacts of integrated ESRs. In this section we compare the supplier offers and the
load shapes from each system for representative winter and summer months to identify the
system characteristics which lead to the differences in ABLMP reduction impacts and draw
some conclusions about the properties of systems in which ESRs will have a higher impact
on the ABLMPs.
The analysis in the section 4.2 suggests that the key factors driving the impacts of ESR
on ABLMPs are the price reductions (increases) and the load facing those prices. Tables 4.4
and 4.5 summarize the base case average peak and off-peak LMPs and loads on the MTS57
and MTS118, respectively. These price differences and load ratios represent the potential
for ABLMP reductions on each respective system. From Tables 4.4 and 4.5 we see that the
annual average peak to off-peak price difference and load ratio on theMTS118 are $28.58 and
1.28, respectively, while on the MTS57 the annual average peak to off-peak price difference
and load ratio are $8.49 and 1.17. The potential for reduced annual ABLMP is greater on
theMTS118 both in terms of the price differential and load ratio—which supports the higher
ABLMP reductions we observe in our case studies on the MTS118 compared to the MTS57.
Furthermore, the seasonal differences in the peak to off-peak price differences and load ratios
are consistent with our observations in Section 4.2.
We have explored the impact of the peak to off-peak load ratio and the peak to off-peak
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Table 4.4: The base case seasonal and annual average peak and off-peak LMPs and loads
on the MTS57
average LMP ($/MWh) average load (MW)
peak off-peak difference peak off-peak ratio
spring 52.54 48.99 3.55 5778 5040 1.15
summer 65.56 45.69 19.87 7616 5918 1.29
fall 48.62 45.13 3.49 5999 5141 1.17
winter 75.66 69.71 5.95 6543 5999 1.09
annual 61.24 52.75 8.49 6485 5523 1.17
Table 4.5: The base case seasonal and annual average peak and off-peak LMPs and loads
on the MTS118
average LMP ($/MWh) average load (MW)
peak off-peak difference peak off-peak ratio
spring 43.73 34.87 8.86 5480 4396 1.25
summer 102.36 48.10 54.26 7039 5131 1.37
fall 51.71 34.22 17.49 5706 4456 1.28
winter 99.20 71.09 28.11 6190 5152 1.20
annual 76.50 47.92 28.58 6104 4782 1.28
price differences on the ABLMPs. However, the extent to which load impacts prices is
dependent upon the seller offers.1 As described in section 4.1, the seller offer curve for a
month in our sensitivity cases is representative of the respective average ISO offer curve
for the same month. To illustrate the impact of the seller offers, MISO-representative offer
curves for August and December 2010 are shown in Fig. 4.11.
As depicted in Fig. 4.11, the offer curves are very flat over a wide range of load values
which results in off-peak prices which differ very little from peak prices in those hours where
both the peak and off-peak load are served by suppliers whose offers lie in this flat segment
of the offer curve. A lack of peak to off-peak period price differentials and similar peak and
off-peak supply elasticities are the main factors contributing to the lower impacts of ESRs
on the ABLMPs in the MTS57 at all penetration levels in the spring, fall and winter. For
example, in December 2010, we see from points C and D in Fig. 4.11 that there is a difference
1The price impacts are also dependent upon buyer bids. However, we have assumed the buyers have an
arbitrarily high willingness to pay and that the supply is always equal to the demand and so only the seller
offers are at play in the extent to which the load impacts the prices.
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Figure 4.11: MISO-representative offer curves for Aug. and Dec. 2010
of around $30 between the price in the hour with the maximum load, around point D, and
the price in hour with the minimum load, around point C. Both points C and D are in the
flat portion of the offer curve, where the elasticity of supply is high. Similarity between
the supply elasticity at points C and D combined with the low winter price differential are
the reasons for the modest ABLMP impacts reported in Table 4.2 for the spring, fall, and
winter.
Conversely, in August 2010, we see from points A and B in Fig. 4.11 that there is a
difference of around $75 between the price in the hour with the peak load, around point
B, and the price in hour with the base load, around point A. In August, the offers of the
suppliers which serve the peak load are in the steeper portion of the offer curve, i.e., where
the elasticity of supply is lower. In general, if there is a sufficient difference between the
peak and off-peak prices to overcome the cost of ESR efficiency losses, ESRs will be effective
if the offers of suppliers which serve the load in peak periods are in the steeper portion of
the offer curve, while the offers of suppliers which serve the off-peak load are in the flatter
portion of the offer curve.
Many ISO offer curves have a similar shape to theMISO-representative curves in Fig. 4.11
where the elasticity of supply decreases as the quantity increases. However, the monotonic
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decrease of supply elasticity is not always the case for ISO supplier offer curves.
The ISO-NE -representative offer curves are an example of offers curves which have seg-
ments where the supply elasticity increases with increasing quantity. ISO-NE -representative
offer curves for July and December 2010 are shown in Fig. 4.12. Unlike the single flat seg-
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Figure 4.12: ISO-NE -representative offer curves for Jul. and Dec. 2010
ment of the MISO-representative offer curves, the ISO-NE -representative offer curves have
two relatively flat segments with an additional steepening portion between 6500 and 7500
MW. The existence of this second steeper portion in the curve is the principal reason for the
modest winter and spring ABLMP impacts we reported in Table 4.3 compared to the other
seasons. In the month of July, we see from points A and B in Fig. 4.12 that the elasticity
of supply is clearly less than in the peak periods, around point B, than in the off-peak peri-
ods, around point A. In the month of December, the supply elasticity in the peak periods,
around point D, is similar to the supply elasticity in the off-peak periods, around point C.
With relatively similar supply elasticities between the peak and off-peak periods and low
differential between peak and off-peak prices, the ESR integration impacts on the ABLMPs
are modest in the winter period on the MTS118.
From this discussion we conclude that for ESRs to be effective at reducing ABLMPs,
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the elasticity of supply must be less in the discharge periods than in the charge periods.
The differential in the peak to off-peak elasticity of supply depends on the ratio of peak to
off-peak load. Deepening penetration of integrated ESRs pushes the points for peak and
off-peak periods, depicted in Figs. 4.11 and 4.12 towards each other along the offer curve.
The limitations of the ABLMP impacts of deepening ESR penetrations are driven by the
differences between the prices, the elasticity of supply and the load in the peak and off-peak
periods.
4.4 The Economic Impacts of DRRs
In Chapter 1 we discussed the aspects of DR and ES resources which led us to the conclusion
that we may view DRRs as a special case of ESRs and represent them as such. Both DR
and ES resources may provide the same energy market service and may therefore be viewed
as substitutable resources. If DR and ES resources are substitutable, the question arises:
Which resource is more effective at providing the energy storage service to the system? In
this section we discuss the economic impacts of deepening DRR penetration and explore the
limits of the benefits in reduced ABLMPs that DRRs may bring to the system and compare
them to those of ESRs.
Table 4.6 summarizes the ABLMP reductions for deepening penetrations of DRRs sea-
sonally and annually on the MTS57. Figure 4.13 depicts the annual ABLMPs for deepening
DRR penetrations. From Fig. 4.13 we see that the highest annual reduction in ABLMPs
with DRRs is achieved at a penetration of 2% and the ABLMPs begin to increase at pen-
etrations of 9% or deeper. In case P5710,0 the ABLMPs increase by approximately 0.65%. In
addition, on the MTS57, the highest annual ABLMP reduction is 0.64% for case P
57
2,0, a
factor of two less than the 1.27% annual ABLMP reduction in P570,2.
To explain the impacts of DRRs on reducing ABLMPs we depict the hourly LMPs and
the hourly loads for the representative summer week of August 9-15, 2010, at bus 12 in Figs.
4.14 and 4.15, respectively, for P570,0, P
57
1,0 and P
57
10,0. DRR curtailments reduce the loads in
the peak periods and, when curtailed energy is recovered, increase the loads in the off-peak
periods, decreasing the ratio of peak to off-peak load. The load shifts may result in price
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Table 4.6: The seasonal and annual ABLMP reductions for deepening penetrations of
DRRs on the MTS57
average buyer LMP reduction (%)
DRR penetration
(%)
spring summer fall winter annual
1 0.13 1.45 0.13 -0.19 0.40
2 0.17 2.63 0.16 -0.54 0.64
3 0.13 3.19 0.03 -1.00 0.61
4 0.03 3.69 -0.13 -1.33 0.60
5 -0.06 3.99 -0.32 -1.62 0.54
6 -0.11 4.05 -0.50 -2.00 0.39
7 -0.22 4.23 -0.62 -2.32 0.30
8 -0.36 4.23 -0.88 -2.87 0.04
9 -0.51 4.02 -1.22 -3.46 -0.30
10 -0.73 3.86 -1.53 -4.11 -0.65
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Figure 4.13: The annual ABLMP for deepening penetrations of DRRs on the MTS57
reductions in peak periods for those remaining loads and price increases in off-peak periods
for the loads and DRRs recovering energy. We see the impacts of this load shifting in Fig.
4.15. In case P571,0 the load is impacted very little by the DRR curtailments and recovery,
while in case P5710,0 we see a significant impact on the load and the formation of new load
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Figure 4.14: The hourly LMPs at bus 12 for the week of Aug. 9–15, 2010, on the MTS57
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Figure 4.15: The hourly loads at bus 12 for the week of Aug. 9–15, 2010, on the MTS57
peaks in the shoulder hours of the day in which the load is nearly as great as the load in the
P
57
0,0 peak hours. The price impacts of these shoulder hour peak loads may be seen in Fig.
4.14. For case P571,0 we see price reductions in the peak periods and minor price increases in
the recovery periods. However, in case P5710,0, while the prices are reduced in the peak hours of
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the day as a result of the DRR curtailments, the off-peak period prices spike in the shoulder
hours where the new peaks have formed. The additional payments in the shoulder hours
overtake the peak period savings, resulting in the ABLMP increases we report in Table 4.6
for DRR penetrations of 9% or deeper. The formation of shoulder hour load peaks causing
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Figure 4.16: The hourly LMPs at bus 12 for the week of Dec. 13–19, 2010, on the MTS57
off-peak period LMP spikes is particularly acute in the winter period. Figure 4.17 depicts
the loads for the winter week of December 13–19, 2010, at bus 12. Again, the impacts of
DRR integration on the loads, and consequently the LMPs, for case P571,0 are relatively minor.
However, in the deep DRR penetration case P5710,0, the load shape is nearly inverted, causing
what were previously the off-peak loads to be peak loads at load levels even higher than
the previous weekly peak load. These new load peaks drive the price peaks shown in Fig.
4.16. We focus on the day of December 15, 2010, in Figs. 4.18 and 4.19 to see the load and
LMP impacts more clearly. The load in shoulder hours, particularly hours 9 and 22, shown
in Fig. 4.19 for case P5710,0, is higher than the peak loads in case P
57
0,0. The impact of these
drastic load changes on the LMPs may be seen in Fig. 4.18. In case P5710,0, we observe LMP
increases of nearly $30 in some of the shoulder hours, resulting in new peaks for case P5710,0
which, like the load, are even higher than the peak prices in case P570,0. The result of these
winter load and corresponding LMP spikes is the increased ABLMPs at all penetrations of
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Figure 4.17: The hourly loads at bus 12 for the week of Dec. 13–19, 2010, on the MTS57
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Figure 4.18: The hourly LMPs at bus 12 for December 15, 2010, on the MTS57
DRR in the winter months reported in Table 4.6..
Table 4.7 summarizes the ABLMPs reductions for deepening penetrations of DRRs sea-
sonally and annually for the MTS118. Figure 4.20 depicts the annual ABLMPs reductions
for deepening DRR penetrations.
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Figure 4.19: The hourly loads at bus 12 for December 15, 2010, on the MTS57
Table 4.7: The seasonal and annual ABLMP reductions for deepening penetrations of
DRRs on the MTS118
average buyer LMP reduction (%)
DRR penetration
(%)
spring summer fall winter annual
1 0.25 1.30 0.76 0.46 0.77
2 0.43 2.40 1.79 0.75 1.45
3 0.68 3.63 1.98 0.92 2.01
4 0.79 4.65 2.09 0.95 2.40
5 0.76 5.44 2.04 0.92 2.66
6 0.65 5.94 1.46 0.98 2.75
8 0.33 6.64 -0.31 0.39 2.46
10 -0.16 6.50 -3.97 -0.35 1.50
12 -0.88 3.92 -9.64 -1.08 -0.67
From Fig. 4.20 we see that DRRs are more effective at reducing ABLMPs on theMTS118
than they are on the MTS57—consistent with our findings for ESRs. However, the high-
est annual ABLMP reduction is still only 2.75% at a 6% DRR penetration. Even in the
summer period, the highest ABLMP reduction with integrated DRRs is only 6.64% at 8%
penetration. In all seasons with the exception of the summer period, the ABLMPs increase
in case P11810,0 and annually the ABLMPs increase in case P
118
12,0. This contrasts with ESRs
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Figure 4.20: The annual ABLMP for deepening penetrations of DRRs on the MTS118
which reduce ABLMPs in all cases.
Overall, we observe annual ABLMP reductions of at most 0.64% at 2% DRR penetra-
tion and 2.75% at 6% DRR penetration on the MTS57 and the MTS118, respectively. In
the following section we further explore the factors, such as the curtailed energy recovery
requirement, which contribute to the reduced price impacts of DRRs compared to ESRs.
4.5 DRR Limitations
From our discussion in Sections 4.2 and 4.4 we concluded that ESRs are more price effective
than DRRs at each penetration level. The reduced price impacts of DRRs compared to ESRs
we observe in the case studies is a direct result of the our representation of the requirements
of FERC Order No. 745 in the simulation methodology and the additional constraints
imposed upon DRRs in the model described in Chapter 2 to represent the physical and
operational limitations of DRRs. In this section we describe two key reasons for the limited
price impacts of DRRs:
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• the “billing unit effect”, and
• the constraints on the operation of DRRs imposed by the requirements of FERC Order
No. 745 and in particular the application of a system-wide threshold price.
When DRR curtailments take place, the remaining loads make an additional payment to
compensate DRRs for their curtailments. The increase in prices resulting from these in-
centive payments is the billing unit effect [7]. The price reductions caused by the DRR
curtailment must be sufficient to cover the compensation of the DRR if the curtailment is
to be cost-effective. The billing unit effect dampens the price reductions impacts of DRR
curtailments for all penetrations of DRRs integration and may even lead to situations where
DRR curtailment results in an increase in ABLMP. We observe the billing unit effect by
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Figure 4.21: The hourly LMPs at bus 59 for the peak hours on July 16, 2010, on the
MTS118
comparing the buyer LMPs between P1180,10 and P
118
10,0 in those hours where DR(ES ) resources
are curtailed (discharging) at full capacity in Fig. 4.21 and the buyer LMPs with and with-
out the additional incentive payment for DRR curtailments for the same set of hours in
Fig. 4.22. We note in Fig. 4.21 that the prices with ESRs are always less than the prices
with DRRs as a result of the additional incentive payment buyers make to DRRs, derived in
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Figure 4.22: The hourly LMPs at bus 59 with and without the DRR incentive payment for
the peak hours on July 16, 2010, on the MTS118
Eq. (2.2). In Fig. 4.22 we show the impact this incentive payment has on the buyer LMPs.
Clearly, the payments made by the remaining buyers to compensate a 10% DRR penetration
for curtailments provided have a significant impact on the buyer LMPs, increasing them by
around 10%, and hence dampen the ABLMP reduction impacts of DRRs.
The second key driver of the reduced price impacts of DRRs is the system-wide threshold
price requirement of FERC Order No. 745. The threshold price is a measure of the cost
effectiveness of DRRs—when the threshold price is met, DRR curtailments are assumed to
be cost effective.
According to our assumptions, the DRR curtailments are restricted to occur between
the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. and DRRs curtail at full capacity whenever they
are accepted for curtailment. In the absence of DRR curtailed energy recovery, these full
capacity curtailments exacerbate the billing unit effect in the shoulder hours. However, when
the curtailed energy is recovered according to the constraint in Equation (2.4), which also is
also applied to DRRs, the recovery of curtailed energy may also cause buyer LMP increases
in the hours in which energy is recovered. Furthermore, we assume the DRRs recover the
curtailed energy in the same day. Our assumptions and the application of the recovered
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energy constraint result in the shoulder hour price spikes we observe in Figs. 4.16 and 4.18.
If the DRR curtails in every peak hour of the day and recovery is assumed to occur at a
capacity no greater than the curtailment, the shoulder hour load spikes, and the resulting
price spikes, are an inevitable consequence of curtailed energy recovery, since the DRR must
recover at full capacity in every recovery hour to ensure the recovered energy constraint is
not violated. ESRs, on the other hand, operate at less than full capacity in the shoulder
hours of the peak and off-peak periods. This operational aspect of ESRs is exemplified by
Fig. 4.4 for case P570,10 where the LMPs in the charge hours never exceed the LMPs in the
discharge hours, which is in direct contrast to the shoulder hour LMP spikes we see in Fig.
4.16 for case P5710,0. The difference between the load shape and the LMP impacts of DR and
ES resources in these two cases is a result of the energy recovery constraints enforced for
each resource in the EMCP.
Due to the threshold criteria, DRRs offer the ISO fewer degrees of freedom than ESRs.
The hours and capacity of curtailment are fixed variables in the MCP for DRRs whereas the
ESR discharge variables are decision variables in the EMCP. The only degrees of freedom
for DRRs are the hours and capacities of recovery, which are also somewhat restricted by
the amount of curtailed energy that must be recovered. The reduced number of degrees of
freedom that DRRs offer to the ISO and the damping effects of the billing unit effect on
ABLMP reductions resulting from DRR curtailments are the key aspects which limit the
DRRs impacts on the ABLMPs.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter we summarized the results of our extensive studies with illustrative sensitivity
cases from theMTS57 and theMTS118. We focused on the impacts of DR and ES resources
on ABLMPs and developed intuition about the characteristics of systems in which DR and
ES resources have greater price impacts.
It is clear from our sensitivity studies that ESR have a greater impact than DRRs at
reducing ABLMPs. Furthermore, we find that DRRs become uneconomic at relatively low
penetrations when the recovery of curtailed energy is taken into account. We summarize our
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key insights as follows:
• ABLMPs reductions are the highest on the MTS57 for DR and ES resource penetra-
tions of 2% and 9%, respectively;
• ABLMPs reductions are the highest on the MTS118 for DR and ES resource penetra-
tions of 6% and 20%, respectively;
• the shape of the offer curve is an important factor determining the price impacts of
DR and ES resources: systems with a lower ratio of the elasticity of supply in the
curtailment/discharge periods to the elasticity of supply in the recover/charge periods
can accommodate deeper penetrations of DR and ES resources;
• the load shape is important factor determining the price impacts of DR and ES re-
sources: systems with a higher ratio of load in peak periods to load off-peak periods
can accommodate deeper penetrations of DR and ES resources; and
• the requirements of FERC Order No. 745, which limit the number of degrees of
freedom ISOs have in controlling DRRs by prescribing a system-wide curtailment
threshold price, along with the billing unit effect, which dampens the ABLMP impacts
of DRR curtailments, are two principal factors in the reduced price impacts of DR as
compared to ES resources.
Clearly, there are limitations to the ABLMP reductions which result from deepening ES
and DR penetrations. The results of the studies presented in this chapter are useful to guide
policies which incentivize appropriate penetrations of DR and ES resources and demonstrate
the usefulness of the flexible market simulation framework presented in this work. In the
following chapter we summarize the work presented this thesis and point out directions for
future research.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Summary
In this work we have provided a comparative economic assessment of the impacts of DR
and ES resources participating in the DAM s. In order to perform the assessment, we
constructed a flexible simulation approach which represents the salient aspects of the DAM s
and the current regulatory environment. The engine of our approach is the EMCP framework
developed in Chapter 2. In the EMCP framework, we explicitly account for ES and DR
resources and the transmission-constrained network. Furthermore, we represent DRRs as
a special case of ESRs, which allows for the comparison of ES and DR resources on equal
footing. Our approach also allows the assessment of the impacts of DRR recovery energy—an
important, and often ignored, component of economic impacts of DRRs on the DAM s.
We applied the simulation approach to perform the comparative economic assessment of
the impacts of deepening capacity penetrations of ES and DR resources with their explicit
participation in DAM s using data from the ISO-NE and MISO. In our studies, we inves-
tigated the reductions in the ABLMP which result from the participation of ES and DR
resources with capacities penetrations in the 0% to 30% of system peak load range.
We found the deployment of ESRs has a greater impact on reducing the ABLMP than
DRRs at each penetration investigated, reducing the ABLMPs by as much as 9.2% compared
to the base case system with no deployed DR or ES resources. DRRs, on the other hand,
resulted in ABLMP reductions of at most 2.7% compared to the base case due to the
additional regulatory constraints in place for DRRs. Furthermore, we find that DRRs cause
increases in the ABLMP at relatively low penetrations when DRR energy recovery is taken
into account—contrary to the results of other studies which have investigated the economic
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impacts of DRRs in the market environment. Additionally, we find that systems which
experience a greater difference between the average peak and off-peak locational marginal
prices (LMPs) and/or a higher ratio of average peak to off-peak loads accommodate deeper
penetrations of ES and DR resources before the ABLMP reductions are saturated with
respect to ES and/or DR resources—the sensitivity of the ABLMP reductions compared
to the base case to an additional MW of ES and DR resource capacity becomes zero or
negative. We find that the economic impacts of DRRs on the ABLMPs saturate at 2%–6%
penetration while those of ESRs saturate at 9%–20% penetration.
The results of such studies provide useful information for planning, the development of op-
erational procedures, the formulation of effective policy and other electricity grid stakeholder
decision making processes. Furthermore, the flexible market simulation approach developed
in this work provides electricity grid stakeholders a means to perform a number of “what if”
studies to analyze the economic impacts of the various aspects of ES and DR resources on
the DAM s.
The prominent role of the electricity sector in addressing global climate change necessitates
understanding on the part of all stakeholders of the greenhouse gas emissions impacts of
resource deployment decisions. An extension of this work is the application of the framework
to investigate the greenhouse gas emissions impacts of DR and ES resources participating
in the DAM s.
Another extension of this work is the integration of the variable and intermittent renew-
able energy sources and their associated uncertainty as well as other sources of uncertainty,
such as resource and line availability, in the simulation framework. Representing sources of
uncertainty would allow the framework to be applied to an even wider range of “what if”
questions.
In this work we have considered ES and DR resources operated by the ISO as a system
resource. A further extension is the application of the simulation approach to study the
impacts of private ES and DR resource providers on the DAM s.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS AND NOTATION
A.1 Acronyms
ABLMP Average buyer locational marginal price
ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
CSP Curtailment service provider
DAM Day-ahead market
DR Demand response
DRR Demand response resource
DSM Demand-side management
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
EMCP Extended transmission-constrained market clearing problem
EPAct U.S. Energy Policy Act of 2005
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
ES Energy storage
ESR Energy storage resource
ESP Energy service provider
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
ISO Independent system operator
ISO-NE Independent System Operator of New England
LMP Locational marginal price
MCP Transmission-constrained market clearing problem
66
MISO Midwest Independent System Operator
PJM Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection
A.2 Notation
The following are the key aspects of the notation used
• all variables are in italics
• all vectors and matrices are in bold and underline
• all optimal solutions are represented with the notation [ · ]?
• all network-related indices are in subscripts
The simulation time-related notation is given as follows
T : index set of simulation periods
T : |T |
t : simulation period with values 1, . . . , T
Kt : index set of daily subperiods from simulation period t
K : |K |
k : daily subperiod with values k1, . . . , kK
Hk : index set of hourly subperiods from daily subperiod k
H : |H |
h : hourly subperiod with values h1, . . . , hH
m : number of days in the multi-day ESR schedule minus one
The seller-related notation for hour h is
S : set of sellers
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S : |S |
s : seller index with values s1, . . . , sS
ps[h] : output of seller s in period h
Cs (ps[h]) : integral of the offer function of a seller s to output ps[h]
psM [h] : upper bound on the capacity offered by seller s
psm[h] : lower bound on the capacity offered by seller s
pgn[h] : sum of the injections into node n
The buyer-related notation for an hour h is
B : set of buyers
B : |B|
b : buyer index with values b1, . . . , bB
pb[h] : demand of buyer b in period h
Bb
(
pb[h]
)
: integral of the bid function of a buyer b to demand pb[h]
psM [h] : upper bound on the capacity bid for by buyer b
psm[h] : lower bound on the capacity bid for by buyer b
pdn[h] : sum of the withdrawals from node n
The network-related notation for an hour h is
N : set of nodes
N : |N | − 1
n : node index with values 0, 1, . . . , N
J : set of lines
J : |J |
j : line index with values 1, 2, . . . , J
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A : reduced network incidence matrix without the column for the slack bus,
A ∈ RJ×(N)
B : reduced branch susceptance matrix, B ∈ RN×N
Bd : diagonal branch susceptance matrix, Bd ∈ R
J×J
b0 : vector of susceptances for branches between each node and the slack
node, b0 ∈ R
N+1
θ[h] : vector of nodal voltage angles (excluding the slack node) in hour
h, θ[h] ∈ RN
fj[h] : flow on line j in hour h
fMj [h] : upper bound on positive flow on line j
fmj [h] : lower bound on negative flow on line j
The ESR-related notation for an hour h is
U : set of storage units
U : |U |
u : storage unit index with values u1, . . . , uU
pu[h] : scheduled charge/discharge quantity of storage unit u
cu[h] : charge capacity scheduled for storage unit u
du[h] : discharge capacity scheduled for storage unit u
duM [h] : upper bound on the discharge capacity of storage unit u
dum[h] : lower bound on the discharge capacity of storage unit u
cuM [h] : upper bound on the charge capacity of storage unit u
cum[h] : lower bound on the charge capacity of storage unit u
yu[h0] : initial stored energy of storage unit u
yu[h] : stored energy of storage unit u
69
yuM [h] : upper bound on the storage capability of storage unit u
yum[h] : lower bound on the storage capability of storage unit u
ηuc : charge efficiency of storage unit u, η
u
c ∈ [0, 1]
ηud : discharge efficiency of storage unit u, η
u
d ∈ [0, 1]
ηur : roundtrip efficiency of storage unit u, η
u
r ∈ [0, 1]
αuk : ratio of charged to discharged energy in unit u at the end of the daily
subperiod
cUn [h] : sum of the storage charging at node n
dUn [h] : sum of the storage discharging at node n
The DRR-related notation for an hour h is
B¯ : subset of buyers in B operating as pure buyers
B˜ : subset of buyers in B capable of acting as a DRRs
B : B˜ ∪ B¯, B˜ ∩ B¯ = ∅
pb¯[h] : load of pure buyer b¯
p˜b˜[h] : curtailment/recovery of DRR b˜
pb˜[h] : load of buyer b˜ in hour h, pb˜[h] ≥ p˜b˜[h]
αb˜k : ratio of recovered to curtailed energy by DRR b˜ at the end of the daily
subperiod
E : set of resources offering energy storage services to the system, U ∪ B˜
e : index of elements of E
The market-related notation for an hour h is
λn[h] : post-curtailment LMP at node n
λ¯n[h] : pre-curtailment LMP at node n
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λr[h] : threshold price
ρS [h] : the payments to sellers
ρB¯[h] : the by pure buyer payments
ρUd [h] : the payments to storage units
ρUc [h] : the payments by storage units
ρB˜d [h] : the payments to DRRs
ρB˜c [h] : the payments by DRRs
N¯ [h] : subset of nodes of N where λn[h] ≤ λ¯n[h]
υn[h] : additional charge to buyers at node n for DRR curtailment incentive
payments
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APPENDIX B
TEST SYSTEM DATA
Table B.1: Monthly threshold prices for the MTS57 and MTS118, respectively
threshold price ($/MWh)
month MTS57 MTS118
Jan. 72.35 114.74
Feb. 78.70 105.70
Mar. 43.54 51.16
Apr. 58.91 39.01
May 60.43 45.28
Jun. 49.70 48.21
Jul. 43.95 47.50
Aug. 44.30 34.64
Sep. 43.39 31.06
Oct. 42.19 26.18
Nov. 59.34 33.74
Dec. 60.41 82.32
Table B.2: MTS118 line data
from to x (Ω) line limit (MW) from to x (Ω) line limit (MW)
1 2 9.99 545 35 37 4.97 545
1 3 4.24 545 33 37 14.2 599
4 5 0.798 545 34 36 2.68 545
3 5 10.8 545 34 37 0.94 545
5 6 5.4 545 38 37 3.75 545
6 7 2.08 545 37 39 10.6 545
8 9 3.05 545 37 40 16.8 545
8 5 2.67 1061 30 38 5.4 2502
9 10 3.22 545 39 40 6.05 545
4 11 6.88 545 40 41 4.87 545
5 11 6.82 545 40 42 18.3 545
11 12 1.96 545 41 42 13.5 545
2 12 6.16 545 43 44 24.54 545
3 12 16 545 34 43 16.81 545
7 12 3.4 545 44 45 9.01 545
11 13 7.31 545 45 46 13.56 545
12 14 7.07 545 46 47 12.7 545
13 15 24.44 545 46 48 18.9 545
14 15 19.5 545 47 49 6.25 545
12 16 8.34 545 42 49 32.3 545
15 17 4.37 545 42 49 32.3 545
16 17 18.01 545 45 49 18.6 545
17 18 5.05 545 48 49 5.05 545
18 19 4.93 545 49 50 7.52 545
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Table B.2: MTS118 line data (cont.)
from to x (Ω) line limit (MW) from to x (Ω) line limit (MW)
19 20 11.7 545 49 51 13.7 545
15 19 3.94 545 51 52 5.88 545
20 21 8.49 545 52 53 16.35 545
21 22 9.7 545 53 54 12.2 545
22 23 15.9 545 49 54 28.9 545
23 24 4.92 877 49 54 29.1 545
23 25 8 545 54 55 7.07 545
26 25 3.82 545 54 56 0.955 545
25 27 16.3 545 55 56 1.51 545
27 28 8.55 545 56 57 9.66 545
28 29 9.43 545 50 57 13.4 545
30 17 3.88 545 56 58 9.66 545
8 30 5.04 2068 51 58 7.19 545
26 30 8.6 545 54 59 22.93 545
17 31 15.63 545 56 59 25.1 545
29 31 3.31 545 56 59 23.9 545
23 32 11.53 545 55 59 21.58 545
31 32 9.85 545 59 60 14.5 545
27 32 7.55 545 59 61 15 545
15 33 12.44 599 60 61 1.35 545
19 34 24.7 599 60 62 5.61 545
35 36 1.02 545 61 62 3.76 545
63 59 3.86 545 90 91 8.36 545
63 64 2 545 89 92 5.05 545
64 61 2.68 545 89 92 15.81 545
38 65 9.86 2275 91 92 12.72 545
64 65 3.02 599 92 93 8.48 545
49 66 9.19 545 92 94 15.8 545
49 66 9.19 545 93 94 7.32 545
62 66 21.8 545 94 95 4.34 545
62 67 11.7 545 80 96 18.2 545
65 66 3.7 545 82 96 5.3 545
66 67 10.15 545 94 96 8.69 545
65 68 1.6 1554 80 97 9.34 545
47 69 27.78 545 80 98 10.8 545
49 69 32.4 545 80 99 20.6 545
68 69 3.7 545 92 100 29.5 545
69 70 12.7 545 94 100 5.8 545
24 70 41.15 599 95 96 5.47 545
70 71 3.55 599 96 97 8.85 545
24 72 19.6 599 98 100 17.9 545
71 72 18 599 99 100 8.13 545
71 73 4.54 545 100 101 12.62 545
70 74 13.23 545 92 102 5.59 545
70 75 14.1 545 101 102 11.2 545
69 75 12.2 545 100 103 5.25 545
74 75 4.06 545 100 104 20.4 545
76 77 14.8 545 103 104 15.84 545
69 77 10.1 545 103 105 16.25 545
75 77 19.99 545 100 106 22.9 545
77 78 1.24 545 104 105 3.78 545
78 79 2.44 545 105 106 5.47 545
77 80 4.85 545 105 107 18.3 545
77 80 10.5 545 105 108 7.03 545
79 80 7.04 545 106 107 18.3 545
68 81 2.02 1167 108 109 2.88 545
81 80 3.7 1167 103 110 18.13 545
77 82 8.53 545 109 110 7.62 545
82 83 3.665 545 110 111 7.55 545
83 84 13.2 545 110 112 6.4 545
83 85 14.8 545 17 113 3.01 545
84 85 6.41 545 32 113 20.3 545
85 86 12.3 545 32 114 6.12 545
86 87 20.74 545 27 115 7.41 545
85 88 10.2 545 114 115 1.04 545
85 89 17.3 545 68 116 0.405 545
88 89 7.12 545 12 117 14 545
89 90 18.8 545 75 118 4.81 545
89 90 9.97 545 76 118 5.44 545
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Table B.3: Load distribution data for the for the MTS118
buyer bus and buyer load (% of total hourly load)
bus load bus load bus load bus load bus load bus load bus load bus load bus load bus load
1 1.2 13 0.8 25 0.0 37 0.0 49 2.1 61 0.0 73 0.1 85 0.6 97 0.4 109 0.2
2 0.5 14 0.3 26 0.0 38 0.0 50 0.4 62 1.8 74 1.6 86 0.5 98 0.8 110 0.9
3 0.9 15 2.1 27 1.7 39 0.6 51 0.4 63 0.0 75 1.1 87 0.0 99 1.0 111 0.0
4 0.9 16 0.6 28 0.4 40 1.6 52 0.4 64 0.0 76 1.6 88 1.1 100 0.9 112 1.6
5 0.0 17 0.3 29 0.6 41 0.9 53 0.5 65 0.0 77 1.4 89 0.0 101 0.5 113 0.1
6 1.2 18 1.4 30 0.0 42 2.3 54 2.7 66 0.9 78 1.7 90 3.8 102 0.1 114 0.2
7 0.4 19 1.1 31 1.0 43 0.4 55 1.5 67 0.7 79 0.9 91 0.2 103 0.5 115 0.5
8 0.7 20 0.4 32 1.4 44 0.4 56 2.0 68 0.0 80 3.1 92 1.5 104 0.9 116 4.3
9 0.0 21 0.3 33 0.5 45 1.2 57 0.3 69 0.0 81 0.0 93 0.3 105 0.7 117 0.5
10 0.0 22 0.2 34 1.4 46 0.7 58 0.3 70 1.6 82 1.3 94 0.7 106 1.0 118 0.8
11 1.7 23 0.2 35 0.8 47 0.8 59 6.5 71 0.0 83 0.5 95 1.0 107 1.2
12 1.1 24 0.3 36 0.7 48 0.5 60 1.8 72 0.3 84 0.3 96 0.9 108 0.0
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Table B.4: Offer data for the for the MTS118 for the months of Jan.–Jun. 2010
monthly seller offer prices ($)
seller bus seller
quant.
(MW )
Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
69 804.5 13.5 12.7 10.5 10 10 11.5
89 706.4 20.2 19.1 15.7 15 15 17.2
80 576.5 27 25.5 21 20 20 23
10 549.5 35 31.5 25 23 23 27
66 491.6 39.5 35.5 27.5 25 25.5 29
65 490.6 43.5 39.5 30 27 28 31
26 413.6 51 44.5 32 29 30 33
100 351.7 56 48 34 31.5 32 34.5
25 319.7 60 51 36.5 33.5 33.5 36.5
49 303.7 65 54.5 38.5 35.5 35.5 39.5
61 259.8 69 58 40.5 37.5 37 42
59 254.8 74 63 43 39.5 39 44
12 184.8 80.5 68 45.5 41 41 46
54 147.9 87.5 72.5 47.5 42 43 48
103 139.9 94 78 50 43.5 45 50
111 135.9 97.5 83.5 52 45 47 53
46 118.9 100 88 53.5 46.5 49 56.5
31 106.9 103.5 92 56.5 48 51 59
87 103.9 107.5 95.5 61 49.5 54 61
1 99.9 110.5 99 64 52.5 59 63
4 99.9 112.5 103.5 69 56.5 61 65
6 99.9 114 108.5 79.5 60 62.5 68
8 99.9 116 110.5 87.5 64 64.5 71.5
15 99.9 118.5 112 96.5 67.5 73 76
18 99.9 121 113 100.5 75 81 84.5
19 99.9 123 114.5 107.5 88 89 90.5
24 99.9 125 116 111 96.5 94.5 99
27 99.9 127 118 113 101.5 99.5 106.5
32 99.9 129 120 115 110 105.5 110
34 99.9 131.5 122 118 113 110 112
36 99.9 134 124 121 115.5 112 114
40 99.9 137.5 126.5 123 121.5 114 116
42 99.9 142.5 131 125 124.5 116.5 118.5
55 99.9 146.5 135 128 127 120.5 121.5
56 99.9 150 139.5 132.5 129 124.5 126.5
62 99.9 153.5 144 139 132.5 128.5 132.5
70 99.9 164 148 142.5 139 132.5 139
72 99.9 175.5 152 145.5 144.5 139 145.5
73 99.9 195.5 169 148.5 147.5 146 150.5
74 99.9 200 186 152.5 151 153.5 169
76 99.9 211.9 196.9 180 162.5 168 183.5
77 99.9 230 201.9 198.5 199.5 191.5 198.5
85 99.9 235 229 219 229 216 218.4
90 99.9 246 232.9 232.9 233.4 229.5 230
91 99.9 251.9 236 237.4 243.4 232.9 235
92 99.9 281 246.4 246.9 252.4 245 249.5
99 99.9 288.4 260 259.5 266.4 260 270
104 99.9 346.4 290 287.9 296.9 278.4 327.9
105 99.9 372.9 357.9 373.9 380 329.5 347.4
107 99.9 396.9 381.4 394.5 395.9 394.5 368.4
110 99.9 466.4 453.4 465.9 437.9 453.9 435.9
112 99.9 587.8 520.5 528.4 530 528.4 517.9
113 99.9 991.3 990.8 991.3 991.3 991.3 991.3
116 99.9 1004.4 1004.4 1004.4 1004.4 1004.4 1004.4
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Table B.5: Offer data for the for the MTS118 for the months of Jul.–Dec. 2010
monthly seller offer prices ($)
seller bus seller quant. (MWh/h) Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
69 804.3 11 9.7 9.7 8.5 10.5 14
89 706.2 16.5 14.6 14.6 12.7 15.7 21
80 576.4 22 19.5 19.5 17 21 28
10 549.4 26 24.5 22 20.5 24 34
66 491.5 28 26.5 24 22 26 38
65 490.5 29.5 28 25.5 24 28 43.5
26 413.5 31 29.5 27.5 25.5 30 49.5
100 351.6 32.5 31 29.5 27.5 32 56.5
25 319.7 34.5 32.5 31.5 30 35.5 61.5
49 303.7 37 35 33.5 32 39 67
61 259.7 40 38 35 34 42.5 71
59 254.7 42.5 41.5 37.5 36.5 47.5 77
12 184.8 45 45 40 39 52.5 81
54 147.8 48 48.5 43 41.5 55 84
103 139.8 51 51 46 44.5 56.5 87.5
111 135.9 53.5 52.5 48.5 47 58.5 92
46 118.9 55.5 54 50.5 49 60 97.5
31 106.9 57.5 56 52.5 51 62 103
87 103.9 59.5 58 54.5 53 64.5 109.5
1 99.9 62.5 60.5 56 55 67 114.5
4 99.9 66 63.5 58 57.5 69.5 117.5
6 99.9 73 68 60.5 60.5 74 121
8 99.9 77.5 72.5 65 69 81.5 124.5
15 99.9 82 77.5 71.5 77 84 128.5
18 99.9 91.5 87 80 83 91 132
19 99.9 97.5 96 93.5 94 108 136
24 99.9 103 101.5 97.5 100 117 139
27 99.9 107.5 108.5 106 110.5 122.5 142
32 99.9 111 114.5 113 116.5 127.5 145.5
34 99.9 115 118 118 120 131.5 149.5
36 99.9 118.5 121.5 121 124.5 135.5 153.5
40 99.9 121.5 125 124.5 129 140 157
42 99.9 125.5 129 129.5 133.5 144.5 161.5
55 99.9 131 133.5 134 138.5 148 166.5
56 99.9 137 139 139.5 144 154.5 169.5
62 99.9 142 145 145 150.5 159.5 173.5
70 99.9 146 150.5 151.5 157 167.5 179
72 99.9 149.5 152.5 156.5 162 172.5 184.5
73 99.9 154 155.5 169 180 194.5 192.4
74 99.9 169.5 168.5 184.5 196 197.4 198.5
76 99.9 175.5 179 196.5 198.5 207.4 217.9
77 99.9 189 196 199.5 217.9 226.4 222.4
85 99.9 202.9 216.4 216.9 244.5 246.4 227.9
90 99.9 219.5 236.4 245 247.9 249.5 245.5
91 99.9 237.4 239 247.4 251 262.9 271.4
92 99.9 243.4 252.4 250 261.9 277.9 286.4
99 99.9 260.5 284 282.9 279.5 301.4 303.9
104 99.9 302.4 315.5 315 302.4 356.4 358.4
105 99.9 338.9 352.9 361.9 362.4 394.5 396.4
107 99.9 366.4 373.4 375 391.9 398.4 407.9
110 99.9 398.4 395.5 394.5 396.9 413.4 433.9
112 99.9 496.4 478.9 449.5 413.9 448.9 455.5
113 99.9 991.3 991.3 991.3 991.3 991.3 991.3
116 99.9 1004.4 1004.4 1004.4 1004.4 1004.4 1004.4
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Table B.6: MTS57 line data
from to x (Ω) line limit (MW) from to x (Ω) line limit (MW)
1 2 2.8 958 7 29 6.48 639
2 3 8.5 639 25 30 20.2 639
3 4 3.66 639 30 31 49.7 639
4 5 13.2 639 31 32 75.5 639
4 6 14.8 639 32 33 3.6 639
6 7 10.2 639 34 32 95.3 639
6 8 17.3 639 34 35 7.8 639
8 9 5.05 447 35 36 5.37 639
9 10 16.79 255 36 37 3.66 223
9 11 8.48 255 37 38 10.09 335
9 12 29.5 255 37 39 3.79 223
9 13 15.8 255 36 40 4.66 639
13 14 4.34 958 22 38 2.95 639
13 15 8.69 958 11 41 74.9 639
1 15 9.1 702 41 42 35.2 639
1 16 20.6 702 41 43 41.2 639
1 17 10.8 958 38 44 5.85 639
3 15 5.3 766 15 45 10.42 275
4 18 55.5 639 14 46 7.35 639
4 18 43 639 46 47 6.8 639
5 13 7.32 639 50 51 22 639
12 13 5.8 1373 10 51 7.12 639
12 6 6.41 639 47 48 2.33 639
7 8 7.12 639 48 49 12.9 319
10 12 12.62 639 49 50 12.8 639
11 16 8.13 639 13 49 19.1 639
12 17 17.9 639 29 52 18.7 639
14 15 5.47 639 52 53 9.84 639
18 19 68.5 639 53 54 23.2 639
19 20 43.4 639 54 55 22.65 639
21 20 77.67 639 11 43 15.3 639
21 22 11.7 639 44 45 12.42 262
22 23 1.52 639 40 56 119.5 639
23 24 25.6 702 56 41 54.9 639
24 25 118.2 255 56 42 35.4 639
24 25 123 255 39 57 135.5 639
24 26 4.73 255 57 56 26 639
26 27 25.4 958 38 49 17.7 639
27 28 9.54 639 38 48 4.82 639
28 29 5.87 639 9 55 12.05 639
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Table B.7: Load distribution data for the for the MTS57
buyer bus and buyer load (% of total hourly load)
bus load bus load bus load bus load bus load bus load
1 4.4 11 0 21 0 31 0.5 41 0.5 51 1.4
2 0.2 12 30.1 22 0 32 0.1 42 0.6 52 0.4
3 3.3 13 1.4 23 0.5 33 0.3 43 0.2 53 1.6
4 0 14 0.8 24 0 34 0 44 1 54 0.3
5 1 15 1.8 25 0.5 35 0.5 45 0 55 0.5
6 6 16 3.4 26 0 36 0 46 0 56 0.6
7 0 17 3.4 27 0.7 37 0 47 2.4 57 0.5
8 12 18 2.2 28 0.4 38 1.1 48 0
9 9.7 19 0.3 29 1.4 39 0 49 1.4
10 0.4 20 0.2 30 0.3 40 0 50 1.7
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Table B.8: Offer data for the for the MTS57 for the months of Jan.–Jun. 2010
monthly seller offer prices ($)
seller bus seller quant. (MWh/h) Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
8 1261.4 48.5 54 24.5 38.5 41 31
1 1139.7 55 60.5 31.5 45.5 46.5 36.5
12 807.3 57.5 63 33.5 48 49 39
3 706.4 59 64.5 35.5 49.5 50.5 40.5
2 504.5 60.5 66 37 51 51.5 42
6 504.5 62 67.5 38 52 52.5 43
9 504.5 64 69.5 39.5 53.5 54 44
48 504.5 66.5 72.5 41.5 55 55.5 46
45 504.5 73.5 78 45 57.5 58 48.5
41 504.5 83 85.5 50.5 62.5 64 54.5
36 504.5 92 94 57 68.5 69.5 61
37 252.3 96.5 97.5 60 71.5 72.5 65
32 252.3 102 102 64 74.5 76 69
56 252.3 106 107 67.5 78 80 74
49 252.3 110.5 112 72 81 83.5 78.5
43 252.3 115.5 116.5 77.5 84.5 87 83.5
24 252.3 126.5 125 83.5 90.5 92.5 88.5
14 252.3 142.5 136.5 93.5 99.5 102.5 99
25 126.1 156.5 145.5 101 104.5 108 107
26 126.1 176 166 134 128.5 119 118
54 126.1 201.5 197.9 157.5 160 152.5 144
38 126.1 232.9 229 192.9 203.5 196.9 194.5
15 126.1 281.9 279.5 232.9 248.4 237.9 224.5
18 63.1 328.9 317.9 288.4 294 291.4 278.4
29 63.1 1049.4 1054.4 1024.4 1039.4 1039.4 1029.4
Table B.9: Offer data for the for the MTS57 for the months of Jul.–Dec. 2010
monthly seller offer prices ($)
seller bus seller quant. (MWh/h) Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
8 1261.4 25 25.5 24.5 24 40.5 40
1 1139.7 31 31.5 31 31 46 46.5
12 807.3 33.5 34.5 34 33.5 48.5 49
3 706.4 35.5 36 35.5 35.5 50.5 51
2 504.6 37 37 37 36.5 52 52
6 504.6 38 38.5 38 38 53.5 53.5
9 504.6 39 39.5 39.5 39.5 55 55
48 504.6 40.5 41 41 41 56.5 56.5
45 504.6 43 43 42.5 43.5 59 58.5
41 504.6 47.5 46.5 45.5 46.5 62.5 63.5
36 504.6 54 52.5 50 51 68.5 70
37 252.3 58.5 56.5 54.5 54 71.5 74
32 252.3 62 60.5 58 57.5 75.5 78
56 252.3 65.5 64.5 61.5 62 79 82
49 252.3 70.5 68.5 65.5 65.5 82.5 88
43 252.3 74.5 73.5 69.5 68.5 87 93.5
24 252.3 79 78.5 75.5 74 92 97.5
14 252.3 87.5 85.5 81 81 99.5 107.5
25 126.1 94 92.5 88 89.5 109 115.5
26 126.1 102 104 98 113 148.5 154
54 126.1 125 126.5 136 156.5 172 176.5
38 126.1 168.5 147 164 189 211.9 222.9
15 126.1 211.9 207.9 215 228.4 249 256.4
18 63.1 259.5 248.4 268.4 317.9 327.9 297.9
29 63.1 1024.4 1024.4 1024.4 1022.7 1039.4 1039.4
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APPENDIX C
ADDITIONAL STUDY RESULTS
Tables C.1–C.4 contain a complete set of ABLMP results from the studies discussed in
Chapter 4.
Table C.1: The seasonal and annual ABLMP reductions for deepening penetrations of
ESRs on the MTS57
average buyer LMP reduction (%)
ESR penetration
(%)
spring summer fall winter annual
1 0.06 1.97 0.07 0.08 0.61
2 0.13 3.34 0.14 0.13 1.04
3 0.16 4.14 0.14 0.12 1.27
4 0.21 4.86 0.16 0.17 1.51
5 0.22 5.54 0.22 0.23 1.74
6 0.30 5.88 0.25 0.19 1.85
7 0.30 6.39 0.29 0.22 2.02
8 0.31 6.71 0.27 0.19 2.10
9 0.32 6.90 0.30 0.20 2.17
10 0.32 7.22 0.38 0.25 2.29
11 0.31 7.40 0.34 0.16 2.31
12 0.31 7.44 0.33 0.24 2.35
13 0.30 7.60 0.33 0.23 2.39
14 0.30 7.47 0.31 0.25 2.36
15 0.29 7.54 0.39 0.23 2.39
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Table C.2: The seasonal and annual ABLMP reductions for deepening penetrations of
DRRs on the MTS57
average buyer LMP reduction (%)
DRR penetration
(%)
spring summer fall winter annual
1 0.13 1.45 0.13 -0.19 0.40
2 0.17 2.63 0.16 -0.54 0.64
3 0.13 3.19 0.03 -1.00 0.61
4 0.03 3.69 -0.13 -1.33 0.60
5 -0.06 3.99 -0.32 -1.62 0.54
6 -0.11 4.05 -0.50 -2.00 0.39
7 -0.22 4.23 -0.62 -2.32 0.30
8 -0.36 4.23 -0.88 -2.87 0.04
9 -0.51 4.02 -1.22 -3.46 -0.30
10 -0.73 3.86 -1.53 -4.11 -0.65
11 -0.94 3.52 -1.81 -4.92 -1.10
12 -1.07 3.12 -2.09 -5.63 -1.52
13 -1.19 2.70 -2.42 -6.48 -2.00
14 -1.39 2.04 -2.91 -7.50 -2.65
15 -1.61 1.42 -3.28 -8.63 -3.30
81
Table C.3: The seasonal and annual ABLMP reductions for deepening penetrations of
ESRs on the MTS118
average buyer LMP reduction (%)
ESR penetration
(%)
spring summer fall winter annual
1 0.77 1.96 1.77 1.10 1.46
2 1.54 3.66 3.51 2.03 2.76
3 2.11 5.34 4.71 2.88 3.91
4 2.56 6.84 5.91 3.63 4.94
5 2.63 8.26 6.79 4.32 5.81
6 2.96 9.44 7.38 4.89 6.55
7 3.05 10.45 7.90 5.16 7.08
8 3.24 11.40 8.54 5.37 7.61
9 3.27 12.07 8.92 5.49 7.94
10 3.37 12.77 9.12 5.70 8.30
11 3.50 13.11 9.41 5.50 8.41
12 3.61 13.56 9.72 5.67 8.68
13 3.72 13.66 9.72 5.65 8.73
14 3.74 13.92 9.69 5.79 8.86
15 3.76 13.93 9.99 5.55 8.83
16 3.80 14.31 10.08 5.46 8.95
17 3.79 14.50 10.30 5.55 9.08
18 3.83 14.61 10.30 5.60 9.15
19 3.82 14.97 10.43 5.57 9.28
20 3.78 14.97 10.37 5.51 9.25
21 3.84 14.77 10.54 5.50 9.20
22 3.77 14.99 10.54 5.50 9.28
23 3.72 15.24 10.41 5.56 9.37
24 3.66 15.04 10.56 5.20 9.18
25 3.73 14.80 10.38 5.63 9.22
26 3.57 14.93 10.04 5.32 9.08
27 3.57 15.15 10.27 5.28 9.19
28 3.70 14.68 10.40 5.38 9.09
29 3.60 14.80 10.56 5.29 9.12
30 3.28 14.98 10.63 5.39 9.18
31 3.62 14.67 10.73 5.62 9.22
32 3.28 7.10 9.52 2.00 5.04
33 3.17 6.90 9.51 1.20 4.68
34 3.82 13.96 10.30 5.39 8.85
35 3.69 14.33 10.54 5.24 8.95
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Table C.4: The seasonal and annual ABLMP reductions for deepening penetrations of
DRRs on the MTS118
average buyer LMP reduction (%)
DRR penetration
(%)
spring summer fall winter annual
1 0.25 1.30 0.76 0.46 0.77
2 0.43 2.40 1.79 0.75 1.45
3 0.68 3.63 1.98 0.92 2.01
4 0.79 4.65 2.09 0.95 2.40
5 0.76 5.44 2.04 0.92 2.66
6 0.65 5.94 1.46 0.98 2.75
7 0.51 6.33 0.65 0.68 2.63
8 0.33 6.64 -0.31 0.39 2.46
9 0.01 6.59 -1.75 -0.03 2.02
10 -0.16 6.50 -3.97 -0.35 1.50
11 -0.44 6.25 -6.78 -0.75 0.78
12 -0.88 3.92 -9.64 -1.08 -0.67
13 -1.55 3.02 -13.29 -1.52 -1.82
14 -1.91 2.07 -16.63 -2.17 -2.97
15 -2.59 0.06 -20.42 -2.68 -4.55
83
REFERENCES
[1] 109th Congress, “Energy policy act of 2005,” Aug. 2008. [Online]. Available:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ58/pdf/PLAW-109publ58.pdf
[2] J. Eyer and G. Corey, “Energy storage for the electricity grid: Benefits and
market potential assessment guide,” Sandia National Laboratories, Sandia Report
SAND2010-0815, 2010. [Online]. Available: http://prod.sandia.gov/techlib/access-
control.cgi/2010/100815.pdf
[3] E. Wesoff, “Slideshow: DOE energy storage project portfolio funded by
ARRA,” News Article, Green Tech Media, June 2012. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Slideshow-DOE-Energy-Storage-
Project-Portfolio-Funded-by-ARRA/
[4] H. Trabish, “Southern California Edison’s 8MW Li-Ion Battery for Wind
Power Storage,” News Article, Green Tech Media, Feb. 2012. [On-
line]. Available: http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Southern-California-
Edisons-8MW-Li-ion-Battery-for-Wind-Power-Storage/
[5] DOE , “Benefits of demand response in electricity markets and recommendations for
achieving them,” U.S. Department of Energy, A Report to the United States Congress,
2006. [Online]. Available: http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/congress-1252d.pdf
[6] FERC , “Order no. 719: Wholesale competition in regions with organized electricity
markets,” 125 FERC 61,071, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Oct. 2008.
[Online]. Available: http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2008/101608/E-
1.pdf
[7] FERC , “Order no. 745: Demand response compensation in organized wholesale energy
markets final rule,” 134 FERC 61,187, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Mar.
2011. [Online]. Available: http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20110315105757-
RM10-17-000.pdf
[8] K. Tweed, “Order 745 raises payments—and questions—for demand re-
sponse,” News Article, Green Tech Media, October 2012. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/order-745-raises-payments-and-
questions-for-demand-response/
84
[9] The Brattle Group, Freeman, Sullivan & Co, and Global Energy Partners, LLC,
“A national assessment of demand response potential,” Federal Energy Regulatory
Comission, Staff Report, 2009. [Online]. Available: http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-
reports/06-09-demand-response.pdf
[10] J. Deane, B. O´ Gallacho´ir, and E. McKeogh, “Techno-economic review of existing and
new pumped hydro energy storage plant,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews,
vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 1293 – 1302, 2010.
[11] J. Chen, F. Lee, A. Breipohl, and R. Adapa, “Scheudling direct load control to minimize
system operational cost,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 1994–2001, Nov.
1995.
[12] K. Sidenblad and S. Lee, “A probabilistic production costing methodology for systems
with storage,” IEEE Trans. on Power App. and Sys., vol. PAS-100, no. 6, pp. 3116–
3124, june 1981.
[13] B. Hobbs, “Optimization methods for electric utility resource planning,” European Jour-
nal of Operational Research, vol. 83, pp. 1–20, 1995.
[14] D. Huang and R. Billinton, “Effects of load sector demand side management applications
in generating capacity adequacy assessment,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 27, no. 1,
pp. 335–343, Feb. 2012.
[15] A. Lamont, “Assessing the economic value and optimal structure of large-scale electric-
ity storage,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., 2012.
[16] R. Sioshansi, P. Denholm, T. Jenkin, and J. Weiss, “Estimating the value of electricity
storage in PJM : Arbitrage and some welfare effects,” Energy Economics, vol. 31, no. 2,
pp. 269–277, 2009.
[17] R. Walawalkar, J. Apt, and R. Mancini, “Economics of electric energy storage for energy
arbitrage and regulation in new york,” Energy Policy, vol. 35, pp. 2558–2568, 2007.
[18] F. Figueiredo, P. Flynn, and E. Cabral, “The economics of energy storage in 14 dereg-
ulated power markets,” Energy Studies Review, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 131–152, 2006.
[19] D. Kirschen, “Demand-side view of electricity markets,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst.,
vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 520–527, May 2003.
[20] P. Cappers, C. Goldman, and D. Kathan, “Demand response in u.s. electricity markets:
Empirical evidence,” Energy, vol. 35, pp. 1526–1535, 2010.
[21] A. Faruqui, R. Hledik, and J. Tsoukalis, “The power of dynamic pricing,” The Electricity
Journal, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 42 – 56, Apr. 2009.
[22] A. Faruqui, R. Hledik, S. Newell, and H. Pfeifenberger, “The power of 5 percent,” The
Electricity Journal, vol. 20, no. 8, pp. 68 – 77, Oct. 2007.
85
[23] M. Caramanis, R. Bohn, and F. Schweppe, “Optimal spot pricing: theory and practice,”
IEEE Trans. on Power Appar. and Sys., vol. PAS-101, no. 9, pp. 3234–3245, Sep. 1982.
[24] K. Spees and L. Lave, “Demand response and electricity market efficiency,” The Elec-
tricity Journal, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 69 – 85, Apr. 2007.
[25] J. Bushnell, B. Hobbs, and F. Wolak, “When it comes to demand response, is FERC
its own worst enemy?” The Electricity Journal, vol. 22, no. 9 - 18, Oct. 2009.
[26] G. Strbac, E. Farmer, and B. Cory, “Framework for the incorporation of demand-side
in a competitive electricity market,” Generation, Transmission and Distribution, IEE
Proceedings-, vol. 143, no. 3, pp. 232 –237, May 1996.
[27] C. Su and D. Kirschen, “Quantifying the effect of demand response on electricity mar-
kets,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 1199–1207, Aug. 2009.
[28] E. Karangelos and F. Bouffard, “Towards full integration of demand-side resources in
joint forward energy/reserve electricity markets,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 27,
no. 1, pp. 280–289, Feb. 2012.
[29] D. Connolly, H. Lund, P. Finn, B. Mathiesen, and M. Leahy, “Practical operation
strategies for pumped hydroelectric energy storage (PHES) utilising electricity price
arbitrage,” Energy Policy, vol. 39, pp. 4189–4196, 2011.
[30] C. Jin, S. Lu, N. Lu, and R. Dougal, “Cross-market optimization for hybrid energy
storage systems,” in IEEE PES General Meeting: The Electrification of Transportation
and the Grid of the Future, IEEE Power and Energy Society. Detroit, Michigan: IEEE
Computer Society, July 2011.
[31] A. Kowli, “Assessment of variable effects of systems with demand response resources,”
M.S. thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, Urbana, Illinois, 2009.
[32] A. Wood and B. Wollenberg, Power Generation Operations and Control, 2nd ed. New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996.
[33] M. Liu and G. Gross, “Framework for the design and analysis of congestion revenue
rights,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 243–251, 2004.
[34] I. Castillo, “Assessment of the impacts of demand curtailments in the DAM s: Issues
in and proposed modifications of the FERC Order No. 745,” M.S. thesis, University of
Illinois at Urbana Champaign, Urbana, Illinois, 2012.
[35] “Electricity,” U.S. Energy Information Adminstration. [Online]. Available:
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/
[36] “Power systems test case archive,” University of Washington Department of Electrical
Engineering. [Online]. Available: http://www.ee.washington.edu/research/pstca/
86
[37] “Market reports,” The Midwest Independent System Operator. [Online]. Available:
https://www.midwestiso.org/Library/MarketReports/Pages/MarketReports.aspx
[38] “Hourly data,” The Independent System Operator of New England. [Online]. Available:
http://www.is-one.com/markets/hrlydata/index.html
[39] D. Rastler, “Electricity energy storage technology options: A white paper primer on
applications, costs, and benefits,” Electric Power Research Institute, White Paper
1020676, 2010.
87
